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IS TRANSFORMATIVE USE  
EATING THE WORLD?† 
CLARK D. ASAY* 
ARIELLE SLOAN** 
DEAN SOBCZAK*** 
Abstract: Fair use is copyright law’s most important defense to claims of copy-
right infringement. This defense allows courts to relax copyright law’s applica-
tion when courts believe doing so will promote creativity more than harm it. As 
the U.S. Supreme Court has said, without the fair use defense, copyright law 
would often “stifle the very creativity [it] is designed to foster.” 
In today’s world, whether use of a copyrighted work is “transformative” has be-
come a central question within the fair use test. The Supreme Court first endorsed 
the transformative use term in its 1994 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. deci-
sion. Since then, lower courts have increasingly utilized the transformative use 
doctrine in fair use case law. In fact, in response to the transformative use doc-
trine’s seeming hegemony, commentators and some courts have recently called 
for a scaling back of the transformative use concept. So far, the Supreme Court 
has yet to respond. But growing divergences in transformative use approaches 
may eventually attract its attention. 
But what is the actual state of the transformative use doctrine? Some previous 
scholars have empirically examined the fair use defense, including the transform-
ative use doctrine’s role in fair use case law. But few have focused specifically on 
empirically assessing the transformative use doctrine in much depth. This Article 
does so by collecting data from all district and appellate court fair use opinions 
between 1991, when the transformative use term first made its appearance in the 
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case law, and 2017. These data include how frequently courts apply the doctrine, 
how often they deem a use transformative, and the win rates for transformative 
users. The data also cover which types of uses courts are most likely to find 
transformative, what sources courts rely on in defining and applying the doctrine, 
and how frequently the transformative use doctrine bleeds into and influences 
other parts of the fair use test. Overall, the data suggest that the transformative 
use doctrine is, in fact, eating the world of fair use. 
This Article concludes by analyzing some possible implications of the findings, 
including the argument that, going forward, courts should rely even more on the 
transformative use doctrine in their fair use opinions, not less. 
INTRODUCTION 
“It would seem that the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of 
recognizing any alteration as transformative, such that [the transformative 
use] doctrine now threatens to swallow fair use. It is respectfully submitted 
that a correction is needed in the law.” 
—Nimmer on Copyright1 
“We’re skeptical of [the Second Circuit’s] approach, because asking exclu-
sively whether something is ‘transformative’ not only replaces the [fair use 
factor] list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which pro-
tects derivative works. . . . We think it best to stick with the statutory list.” 
—Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC2 
Fair use is copyright law’s most important defense to claims of copyright 
infringement.3 The defense enables numerous uses of copyrighted material that 
would otherwise violate copyright law. Google’s copying of millions of copy-
righted books as part of Google Books, for instance, is possible because courts 
have ruled that Google digitally copying those books into its database is a fair 
use.4 Search engines’ display of copyrighted materials in response to search 
                                                                                                                 
 1 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B][6] (Matthew 
Bender ed., rev. ed. 2019). 
 2 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 3 Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1102, 
1141 (2017). 
 4 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[We] conclude that the 
district court correctly sustained Google’s fair use defense.”); Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 
87, 101 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e conclude that the doctrine of fair use allows the Libraries to digitize 
copyrighted works for the purpose of permitting full-text searches.”); David Kravets, Fair Use Pre-
vails as Supreme Court Rejects Google Books Copyright Case, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/fair-use-prevails-as-supreme-court-rejects-google-books-
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queries also depends on the fair use defense,5 as do other technological uses of 
copyrighted materials (including, in days gone by, using VCRs).6 Similarly, 
parodists, bloggers, news reporters, researchers, authors, artists, consumers, 
and educators all rely on the fair use defense for a number of socially benefi-
cial uses of copyrighted materials.7 In short, fair use matters in a number of 
important contexts. Without it, the Supreme Court has opined, copyright law 
would frequently “stifle the very creativity [it] is designed to foster.”8 
Given its importance, scholars have devoted an enormous amount of 
time to studying fair use.9 And increasingly more of that effort has focused 
on assessing what it means for a use to be “transformative.”10 This shift has 
occurred largely since and because the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly en-
dorsed the “transformative use” term in its 1994 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu-
sic, Inc. fair use decision.11 Since that time, the transformative use inquiry 
has gained momentum in case after case, with some labeling it the most criti-
cal question in the overall fair use analysis.12 Indeed, once courts determine 
that a use is transformative, that determination often seems to dictate the rest 
of the fair use analysis and, ultimately, the case’s outcome.13 In fact, as re-
                                                                                                                 
copyright-case/ [https://perma.cc/9LCR-MJZK] (reporting that because the Supreme Court declined to 
hear the Authors Guild’s appeal, the Second Circuit’s opinion from Authors Guild v. Google stands). 
 5 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google 
has put Perfect 10’s thumbnail images . . . to a use fundamentally different than the use intended by 
Perfect 10. . . . [C]onsidering the other fair use factors, all in light of the purpose of copyright, we 
conclude that Google’s use of Perfect 10’s thumbnails is a fair use.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e conclude that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images as thumbnails in its 
search engine is a fair use.”). 
 6 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419–20, 454–55 (1984) (holding 
that using VCRs to time-shift recorded shows was a fair use); Joe Mullin, Google Beats Oracle—
Android Makes “Fair Use” of Java APIs, ARSTECHNICA (May 26, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2016/05/google-wins-trial-against-oracle-as-jury-finds-android-is-fair-use/ [https://perma.
cc/6YDD-P2MM] (summarizing a case where Google’s use of limited portions of Oracle’s Java API 
software was found to be a fair use). 
 7 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (listing “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research” as types of use that may qualify for 
the fair use defense). 
 8 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
 9 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978– 2005, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 n.64 (2008) (noting that there were typically more law review articles 
devoted to fair use in any given sampled year than actual fair use judicial opinions in the same year). 
 10 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 
739, 755, 768 (2011) (pointing to empirical data in support of the argument that the transformative use 
inquiry has come to dominate fair use doctrine). 
 11 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 12 Netanel, supra note 10, at 768. 
 13 See Clark D. Asay, Essay, Transformative Use in Software, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 12–13 
(2017), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/05/70-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-
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flected in the epigraph above, some prominent copyright commentators and 
courts—particularly the Seventh Circuit—believe that courts have expanded 
the transformative use concept too far, in ways that undermine copyright 
law’s overall effectiveness.14 
Despite the importance of the transformative use concept, however, we 
have mostly anecdotal accounts of its role within the fair use inquiry. To date, 
only a few scholars have studied the transformative use concept empirically.15 
And though these studies provide useful information on what types of uses 
courts are most likely to view as transformative16 and how frequently parties 
                                                                                                                 
Asay.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TDZ-6L7Q] (summarizing some of the cases and literature espousing this 
view). 
 14 See infra note 264 and accompanying text (noting critiques of the transformative use inquiry). 
Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit have both expressed skepticism 
about the role the transformative use concept should play. See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (Easterbrook, 
J.) (criticizing focusing on the transformative use concept in fair use analyses); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns 
Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (calling application of the transformative use 
concept “confusing”); see also Jennifer Pitino, Has the Transformative Use Test Swung the Pendulum 
Too Far in Favor of Secondary Users?, 56 ADVOCATE 26, 29–30 (2013) (arguing that courts have 
taken transformative use too far). 
 15 See Beebe, supra note 9, at 554, 563, 577–78, 603–07 (presenting empirical findings relating to 
fair use decisions between 1978 to 2005, including findings relating to the transformative use con-
cept); Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the Convergence of 
Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 260, 262, 265 (2012) (empirically analyzing fair use case law to assess what the term “trans-
formative” means according to the courts); Netanel, supra note 10, at 719, 739, 745, 755, 759–67 
(providing empirical data relating to fair use decisions, with a particular focus on more recent deci-
sions and their adoption of and emphasis on the transformative use concept); Matthew Sag, Predicting 
Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 74–77, 79–80, 84 (2012) (studying several factors that appear to pre-
dict whether a use is likely to be considered a fair use and including an emphasis on factors likely to 
lead to a finding of transformative use and, therefore, fair use); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair 
Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2548–63, 2619–20 (2009) (pushing back against the common cri-
tique that fair use is unpredictable by creating a taxonomy of typical fair uses that courts have recog-
nized, including a category of uses that are likely to be considered transformative uses); Laurie To-
massian, Note, Transforming the Fair Use Landscape by Defining the Transformative Factor, 90 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1329, 1352 (2017) (analyzing fair use appellate cases between 2010 to 2015 to assess 
the impact of the transformative use concept). After the publication process for this Article began, 
Jiarui Liu came out with an in-depth empirical study on the transformative use concept. See Jiarui Liu, 
An Empirical Study of Transformative Use in Copyright Law, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163, 166 
(2019) (presenting a study of all reported transformative use decisions through 2016). Professor Liu’s 
findings, which are highly recommended, buttress some of this project’s results. This study, however, 
goes beyond his findings in several important respects and employs some different methodological 
approaches to related questions. 
 16 See Sag, supra note 15, at 84 (summarizing the factors likely to lead to a finding of transforma-
tive use); Samuelson, supra note 15, at 2548–63 (providing a category of uses that are likely to be 
considered transformative). 
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with a transformative use finding win their cases,17 they fall short of capturing 
the full impact of the transformative use concept in several important respects. 
For starters, with one recent exception,18 each of the most important fair 
use studies is increasingly dated. Barton Beebe’s influential fair use study, for 
instance, ends its empirical investigation in 2005.19 Pamela Samuelson’s help-
ful taxonomy concludes in 2009.20 Neil Netanel’s follow-up study to Beebe’s 
research ends its data collection in 2010.21 And Matthew Sag’s 2012 empirical 
study is based on district court data with a cutoff date of early 2011.22 Yet in 
the years since, both district and appellate courts have decided some of the 
most important fair use cases in decades,23 including some that commentators 
view as fundamentally expanding the transformative use concept.24 Hence, 
although these previous studies provide a number of important insights about 
fair use generally and transformative use specifically, they fail to capture a 
number of important recent fair use—and transformative use—
developments.25 This Article picks up where these previous studies left off by 
incorporating nearly a decade of additional fair use case law into its ambit. 
                                                                                                                 
 17 See Beebe, supra note 9, at 605–06 (providing statistics on this question of the likelihood of 
success in a transformative use finding); Netanel, supra note 10, at 755 (providing statistics on this 
question as a follow-up to the Beebe study). 
 18 See Liu, supra note 15, at 166 (studying transformative use cases up to 2016). 
 19 Beebe, supra note 9, at 554. 
 20 See Samuelson, supra note 15, at 2539 (displaying the publication year of Samuelson’s article 
as 2009). 
 21 Netanel, supra note 10, at 719. 
 22 Sag, supra note 15, at 52. 
 23 See, e.g., Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 173–74, 180–81 (2d Cir. 
2018) (finding that recording Fox News’ content and making it available for searching purposes was 
not a fair use, despite finding that the use was transformative); Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 
1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that reproduction of an unflattering photo of a real estate tycoon 
on a critical blog was fair use); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 
2014) (assessing fair use of copyrighted material by universities in the Georgia university system); 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97, 103 (finding that Google’s copying of millions of copyrighted books into 
a searchable database was a transformative use and, overall, a fair use); Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 757–58 
(finding reproduction of a photograph of a mayor on a t-shirt was fair use); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 
694, 699, 711–12 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that a famous artist’s reuse of copyrighted materials in his 
own “appropriation” of artistic efforts was transformative and, overall, a fair use). 
 24 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[B][6] (discussing a 2012 Ninth Circuit case, Monge 
v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012), and explaining that “the only clear lesson to 
emerge is how bitterly disputed the transformative test has proven to be in application”). 
 25 See infra notes 115–158 and accompanying text (summarizing key empirical studies of fair use 
and detailing the ways in which this study adds to the existing literature). One recent student Note 
does include some analysis of case law between 2010 and 2015, but focuses solely on appellate case 
law to assess a split between the Second and Seventh Circuits regarding what role transformative use 
should play in the overall fair use inquiry. See Tomassian, supra note 15, at 1346, 1352–58. This 
Article, conversely, includes case law into 2017, including district court opinions, and tracks a much 
broader range of metrics in assessing transformative use and fair use more generally. See infra notes 
161–263 and accompanying text (discussing the methodology and results of this Article’s study). 
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But this study does more than merely fill in the chronological gaps. Pre-
vious studies assessing fair use and the transformative use component thereof 
have typically focused on providing general statistics of how frequently trans-
formative users win their cases,26 or, in one instance, identified proxies for 
transformative use that predict whether a court will find a use to be fair.27 In 
empirically addressing the role of transformative use, therefore, previous 
scholarship has often confined itself to noting correlations between a finding of 
transformative use and an overall finding of fair use.28 From such statistics, 
scholars have drawn conclusions as to what role the transformative use concept 
plays within fair use doctrine more generally.29 
Although these general statistics are useful, this Article tracks several ad-
ditional transformative use metrics to better understand the concept’s role 
within the fair use inquiry. These metrics include new data relating to the 
sources that courts use in defining and applying the transformative use doctrine 
and metrics relating to what types of uses courts are likely to find transforma-
tive and, thus, fair.30 
This Article also collects, for the first time, metrics relating to how fre-
quently courts consider transformative use when deciding other fair use fac-
tors.31 These data are useful because they provide a clearer understanding of 
how courts actually apply the transformative use concept throughout the fair 
use inquiry. To briefly illustrate: the fair use test typically involves courts as-
sessing four statutorily defined factors, and courts traditionally examine the 
transformative use concept as part of the first of these four factors.32 But what 
becomes clear when reading fair use opinions is that courts also often discuss 
the transformative use concept within discussions of the remaining three fac-
tors. Indeed, the Supreme Court case that officially endorsed the transforma-
tive use concept—Campbell—directs courts to do so.33 Hence, courts often 
discount the impact of factor two—the nature of the work—in light of the 
court deeming a defendant’s use of the copyrighted work to be transforma-
                                                                                                                 
 26 Beebe, supra note 9, at 605–06; Netanel, supra note 10, at 755. Netanel, in particular, does 
provide some useful statistics focused more particularly on the transformative use concept. Netanel, 
supra note 10, at 736, 739–45. This study builds on his findings and goes beyond them. See infra 
notes 161–263 and accompanying text (detailing this study’s methodology and results). 
 27 Sag, supra note 15, at 74–77, 79–80, 84. 
 28 Beebe, supra note 9, at 605–06; Netanel, supra note 10, at 755; Sag, supra note 15, at 79–80. 
 29 Beebe, supra note 9, at 605–06; Netanel, supra note 10, at 755; Sag, supra note 15, at 79–80. 
 30 See infra notes 161–263 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 215–243 and accompanying text. 
 32 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing the four non-exclusive factors that courts are to consider when as-
sessing whether use of copyrighted materials constitutes fair use); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (indicat-
ing that the transformative use concept is a key piece of assessing fair use’s first factor); see infra note 
66 and accompanying text (outlining the four factors). 
 33 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78. 
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tive.34 Courts frequently engage in similar discounting on factor three—the 
amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work used—and factor four—the 
use’s effect on the market for the copyrighted work—when a court considers a 
defendant’s use to be transformative.35 
By tracking how often the transformative use concept affects resolution of 
the remaining three factors, this Article helps shed light on how courts actually 
use the transformative use concept more broadly within the fair use inquiry. 
And this Article tracks this data not only for more recent fair use cases, but 
also for fair use case law that earlier studies already incorporate. As part of 
assessing whether transformative use is actually “eating the world” of fair use, 
as some commentators suggest,36 this Article thus examines several previously 
untracked metrics to more fully decipher transformative use’s meaning and im-
pact on the fair use doctrine’s application.37 
This study’s results provide a number of important findings. Transforma-
tive use is eating the fair use world and is doing so more than previously sus-
pected. This conclusion is based on several pieces of empirical evidence. First, 
consistent with one recent study,38 over time a vast majority of both appellate 
and district courts have come to utilize the transformative use paradigm in 
their opinions, with district courts in particular adopting the transformative use 
concept in about ninety-one percent of their opinions since 2011.39 This district 
court data stand in stark contrast to some previous studies, which showed that 
district court opinions used the transformative use concept much less frequent-
                                                                                                                 
 34 See, e.g., Warren Publ’g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402, 423 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding 
that although factor two disfavored fair use, its impact in the overall fair use calculus was limited 
because the use was transformative). 
 35 See, e.g., HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 99–100 (finding that copying entire books into a digital re-
pository did not result in market harm because the use was deemed transformative); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Google, Inc., 2010 WL 9479060, at *12–13 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010) (finding the third factor to be 
neutral, despite the fact that Google copied the entirety of the work, because of Google’s critical, 
research purposes that the court earlier deemed to be transformative). 
 36 See Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 563 (2016) (bemoan-
ing modern courts’ focus on transformative use as applied to visual arts fair use cases because that 
focus is difficult to square with modern art’s foundational premises). 
 37 See infra notes 204–243 and accompanying text. What is equally clear when reading fair use 
opinions is that inter-factor influence is not limited to factor one and the transformative use inquiry. 
See, e.g., Kane v. Comedy Partners, 2003 WL 22383387, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003) (stating that 
because the use was transformative, factor two is less significant); Gaylord v. United States, 85 
Fed. Cl. 59, 70 (2008) (implying that factor three’s weight in the overall analysis was less because the 
use was transformative). Thus, this Article also tracks, as part of this study, how frequently the factors 
appear to affect the resolution of the other factors. See infra notes 215–243 and accompanying text. 
 38 See Liu, supra note 15, at 174–76 (presenting empirical evidence of the rise in transformative 
use opinions beginning in 1991 and going through 2016). 
 39 See infra tbl.3. 
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ly than appellate courts.40 District courts’ widespread adoption of transforma-
tive use is particularly important because very few litigants make it past the 
district court, meaning that what happens with regards to transformative use at 
the district court level is critically important.41 
Second, consistent with previous studies, parties that win the transforma-
tive use question win the overall fair use question at extremely high rates.42 
Contrary to some commentators’ arguments, however, the data in this study do 
not indicate that merely invoking the transformative use concept means the 
court will find the use to be transformative or fair.43 Indeed, this Article pre-
sents a number of metrics showing that particular types of uses are unlikely to 
ever be found transformative.44 Furthermore, the data indicate that win rates 
between opinions that raise the transformative use concept and those that do 
not are near equal.45 And of the opinions that discuss transformative use, only 
about half of defendants win the transformative use inquiry.46 But when they 
do, those defendants nearly always succeed on their fair use defense.47 And 
when they do not, they nearly always lose.48 Winning the transformative use 
inquiry, then, is vital. And in today’s fair use case law, it is nearly always on 
the table. 
Finally, transformative use affects resolution of other factors within the 
fair use inquiry more than any other subfactor or factor.49 This remains true 
even when including hundreds of opinions in the data that do not invoke the 
transformative use doctrine; when removing those opinions, the frequency 
with which courts use the transformative use concept to resolve other fair use 
factors skyrockets.50 Hence, although other factors and subfactors show up in 
                                                                                                                 
 40 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 9, at 604–05 (discussing statistics which show that appellate courts 
use the transformative use doctrine more than district courts). 
 41 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Fur-
ther Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 659–60 
(2004) (showing that a high percentage of federal cases are never even appealed, let alone accepted 
for adjudication). 
 42 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 9, at 605 (“[I]n those opinions in which transformativeness did 
play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on the outcome of factor one but on the over-
all outcome of the fair use test.”); Liu, supra note 15, at 177 (“Before 1995, transformative use was 
never successful in any copyright cases. . . . During the decade from 2001 to 2010, the average win 
rate soared to 54.3%. It further improved to 63.3% between 2011 and 2016.”). 
 43 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[B][6] (arguing that the transformative use 
doctrine is excessively invoked and “threatens to swallow fair use”). 
 44 See infra notes 244–263 and accompanying text. 
 45 Compare infra tbl.7, with infra tbl.8. 
 46 See infra tbl.8. 
 47 See infra tbl.9 and app. A. 
 48 See infra tbl.9 and app. A. 
 49 See infra tbls.11 & 12. 
 50 See infra tbl.11. 
914 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:905 
unexpected places within the overall fair use analysis, none does more often 
than transformative use. This piece of evidence, tracked for the first time in 
this study, provides additional evidence of the transformative use concept’s 
powerful impact on fair use law more generally.51 
This Article has three Parts. Part I provides background on the fair use 
doctrine and previous empirical studies examining it.52 Part II lays out this Ar-
ticle’s methodology and results.53 Part III concludes by examining some nor-
mative and theoretical implications relating to this study’s findings, including 
the claim that transformative use should play an even bigger role in the fair use 
inquiry going forward.54 
I. FAIR USE BACKGROUND 
This Part lays out some basic background on the fair use defense and its 
historical development in the courts.55 It then provides a brief overview of how 
previous scholars have empirically assessed how courts apply the fair use doc-
trine, including the transformative use concept.56 
A. Fair Use 101—A Primer 
The fair use doctrine’s history is well-known. This Section does not at-
tempt to capture all of its details, but instead provides a snapshot of it to lay the 
groundwork for subsequent parts of the Article.57 
In general, copyright law provides authors with exclusive rights pertain-
ing to whatever original works the authors create.58 For instance, an author of a 
book has exclusive rights with respect to that book, including, under today’s 
copyright laws, the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, distribute, 
publicly perform, and publicly display the book.59 Therefore, if a third party 
would like to exercise any of these rights, that third party generally must ob-
tain the author’s permission or risk being sued for copyright infringement.60 
For instance, if the third party would like to reproduce the book or make a 
                                                                                                                 
 51 See infra notes 185–263 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 55–158 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 159–263 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 264–347 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 57–114 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 115–158 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 58–113 and accompanying text. 
 58 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106. 
 59 Id. § 106. 
 60 Id. § 501. 
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movie based on it, typically that third party must clear those rights with the 
copyright owner.61 
But what if the third party only wants to reproduce a small portion of the 
book for purposes of critiquing it in a newspaper article? Or the third party 
would like to copy substantial portions of the book into his or her own book, 
which he or she considers a parody of the original? In response to these and 
similar situations, courts developed the fair use doctrine at common law.62 
Courts use fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” to permit socially beneficial 
uses of copyrighted works that copyright law, strictly applied, would otherwise 
bar.63 The doctrine thereby guarantees “breathing space within the confines of 
copyright.”64 
But what counts as a fair use? The defense has no clear definition; in-
stead, four factors have long guided courts in answering this question, and 
Congress codified those four factors as part of the Copyright Act of 1976.65 
These factors, briefly mentioned in this Article’s Introduction, consist of the 
following: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.66 
Several of these factors include important subfactors that courts often consider 
in resolving the fair use question. For instance, under factor one, courts typi-
cally consider whether the purported fair use is for a commercial purpose.67 
Generally, when a defendant makes commercial uses of copyrighted works, 
                                                                                                                 
 61 Id. 
 62 See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1525, 1531–32 (2004) (describing and reinterpreting some of the fair use doctrine’s 
historical development); Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1373–
74 (2011) (describing development of the fair use precursor in English courts). 
 63 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“Whether . . . 
copying . . . is or is not fair must be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.”); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (identifying fair use as 
an “‘equitable rule of reason’ to be applied in light of the overall purposes of the Copyright Act”) 
(quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448). 
 64 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 65 17 U.S.C. § 107; Laura Zapata-Kim, Note, Should YouTube’s Content ID Be Liable for Mis-
representation Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act?, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1847, 1855 (2016). 
 66 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 67 Beebe, supra note 9, at 597. 
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winning factor one—and the fair use question more generally—becomes more 
difficult for the defendant, though certainly not insurmountable.68 Courts also 
often consider under factor one the propriety of the defendant’s conduct and 
whether the use fits into one of the enumerated categories in the preamble to 
17 U.S.C. § 107.69 
Factor two often includes two distinct inquiries. The first is whether the 
work is factual or creative in nature, with factual works subject to a greater 
scope of fair use and creative works to a narrower one.70 The second subfactor 
concerns the copyrighted work’s publication status; uses of unpublished works 
are less likely to be deemed fair, while courts are more likely to consider uses 
of published works as fair.71 
Under factor three, courts consider subfactors relating to both the quanti-
tative and qualitative amount of the borrowing.72 If some party purportedly 
making fair use of a copyrighted work takes a substantial percentage of the 
underlying work, in general a fair use finding becomes less likely.73 Relatedly, 
even small takings of a copyrighted work can count against fair use if that tak-
ing relates to the “heart,” or most important part, of the copyrighted work.74 
Factor four may have no real subfactors of its own; instead, it often be-
comes a place for courts to synthesize their discussion of the other three factors 
and their subfactors.75 As part of such syntheses, courts often incorporate a 
presumption that commercial uses of the copyrighted work result in market 
harm.76 Courts also often consider how market opportunities for both the orig-
inal work and derivatives thereof would fare if the use in question became 
widespread.77 Furthermore, courts sometimes restrict themselves to assessing 
market harm to “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.”78 
                                                                                                                 
 68 Id. at 602. 
 69 Id. at 607–09. 
 70 See Timothy Hill, Entropy and Atrophy: The Still Uncertain Status of the Fair Use of Un-
published Works and the Implications for Scholarly Criticism, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 79, 
89–90 (2003) (discussing this inquiry within factor two). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Preeta Reddy, Note, The Legal Dimension of 3D Printing: Analyzing Secondary Liability in 
Additive Layer Manufacturing, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 222, 237 (2014). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589); see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565. 
 75 Beebe, supra note 9, at 618. 
 76 See, e.g., Monge, 688 F.3d at 1181 (explaining it would be reasonable to presume market harm 
under the fourth factor because the defendant’s use was commercial in nature); Leadsinger, Inc. v. 
BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 2008) (presuming market harm under the fourth 
factor because the defendant’s use was commercial in nature). 
 77 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 
1248 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (articulating this standard and applying it to the facts of the case). 
 78 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ringgold v. Black 
Entm’t TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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As with any multi-factor test, courts have applied the fair use test incon-
sistently. Indeed, one of the most frequent complaints about the fair use doc-
trine is that it is incoherent and unpredictable.79 As one scholar famously put it, 
the fair use defense may boil down to the “right to hire a lawyer” because its 
unpredictability means that parties cannot actually rely on it ex ante, instead 
having to resort to ex post judicial adjudication before they know their rights.80 
Nevertheless, part of that unpredictability is by design.81 Fair use is meant 
to be a flexible standard “defy[ing] definition” that courts can adapt to achieve 
the most just results in any given situation.82 Indeed, even the four factors 
listed in the Copyright Act are non-exhaustive, meaning that courts are permit-
ted to, and sometimes do, take into account additional factors in a given situa-
tion.83 Hence, codification of the fair use doctrine as part of the 1976 Copy-
right Act was not meant to stifle its ongoing development under the common 
law.84 
Courts have taken to heart this flexibility in further refining the fair use 
doctrine over the years. One of the most important refinements to the doctrine 
occurred in the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision.85 In that case, the Court 
explicitly adopted for the first time the transformative use subfactor as part of 
the first fair use factor discussion (the purpose and character of the use).86 The 
                                                                                                                 
 79 See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 66 (2008) (“Given the doc-
trine’s open-ended, case-specific cast and inconsistent application, it is exceedingly difficult to predict 
whether a given use in a given case will qualify[.]”); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 1087, 1090 (2007) (“While the doctrine’s attention to context has many salutary attributes, it is 
so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to artists, educators, journalists, 
Internet users, and others who require use of another’s copyrighted expression in order to communi-
cate effectively.”). 
 80 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004). 
 81 See Samuelson, supra note 15, at 2540 (“A well-recognized strength of the fair use doctrine is 
the considerable flexibility it provides in balancing the interests of copyright owners . . . and the inter-
ests of subsequent authors in drawing from earlier works . . . as well as the interests of the public in 
having access to new works and making reasonable uses of them.”). 
 82 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
 83 TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 178 (2d Cir. 2016) (“That codification does 
not so much define ‘fair use’ as provide a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide courts’ fair use de-
terminations.”). 
 84 See id. (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05) (“[Codification] affords the [fair 
use] doctrine a certain ‘malleability’ that can challenge judicial application.”). 
 85 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79 (applying transformative use as a subfactor under factor 
one). 
 86 Id. Though this case was the first time the Court explicitly adopted the transformative use term, 
courts prior to the decision often applied something similar. In fact, the case that commentators often 
credit for first articulating the fair use standard in U.S. law includes language that resembles the trans-
formative use standard. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (indicating that 
uses that “supersede the use of the original work” are less likely to be considered fair). 
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Court defined transformative uses as those that add “something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new ex-
pression, meaning, or message” rather than simply “‘supersed[ing] the objects’ 
of the original creation.”87 In the actual case, the Court held that the hip hop 
group 2 Live Crew’s rap parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” was trans-
formative in part because it “provide[d] social benefit, by shedding light on an 
earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”88 And although the 
Court noted that a “transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding 
of fair use,” it also indicated that “the goal of copyright, to promote science 
and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”89 
Given the Court’s emphasis in Campbell on the transformative use con-
cept, the doctrine has gained traction as one of the most important subfactors 
that courts consider when assessing whether a use of a copyrighted work is 
fair.90 This shift in focus stands in stark contrast to some previous fair use case 
law, which emphasized factor four—the use’s effect on the copyrighted work’s 
potential market and value—as the dominant consideration in the fair use in-
quiry.91 Indeed, nine years prior to its Campbell decision, the Supreme Court in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises had identified factor four 
as by far the most important factor in the fair use inquiry.92 Campbell retracted 
from that position, instead emphasizing the importance of factor one and the 
transformative use concept within it.93 
In focusing the fair use inquiry on the transformative use concept, the 
Campbell Court included several admonitions to future courts about how to 
suffuse the entire fair use inquiry with transformative use considerations.94 For 
instance, as briefly discussed above, under factor two—the nature of the copy-
righted work—courts typically assess whether the copyrighted work is more 
creative or factual in nature.95 In general, copyright law affords factual works 
(such as a biography or news report) less protection; indeed, mere facts on 
                                                                                                                 
 87 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 88 Id. at 579, 583. 
 89 Id. at 579. 
 90 Netanel, supra note 10, at 739, 755 (pointing to case law metrics that indicate the rising im-
portance and prevalence of the transformative use concept). 
 91 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. But again, prior to Harper & Row, there was arguably a great-
er emphasis on the approach that Campbell reintroduced, even beginning with Folsom, the seminal 
fair use case. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345. 
 92 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
 93 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79. 
 94 See id. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of 
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
 95 Hill, supra note 70, at 89–90. 
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their own cannot be copyrighted at all.96 Factor two attempts to incorporate 
this tenet of copyright law into the fair use inquiry by acknowledging that use 
of factual works is more likely to be considered fair, while use of highly crea-
tive works is less likely to be a fair use.97 Consequently, one might reasonably 
conclude that factor two would favor Roy Orbison in the actual Campbell de-
cision, because “Pretty Woman” is the type of creative work “closer to the core 
of intended copyright protection than others.”98 
Yet the Campbell court noted in considering factor two that in cases in-
volving transformative uses such as parodies, the nature of the work, whether 
factual or creative, is unlikely to matter much in determining the overall fair 
use question.99 This is so because transformative uses—such as 2 Live Crew’s 
rap parody of “Pretty Woman”—often rely on highly creative, well-known 
works to effectively carry out their transformative purpose.100 Hence, though 
the Court noted that Orbison’s work was the type of creative expression copy-
right law was meant to protect, 2 Live Crew’s transformative purpose meant 
that the creative nature of the work carried little weight in the overall fair use 
analysis.101 
The Court provided a similar admonition with respect to the third fair use 
factor, the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work used. Typically, 
as mentioned above, the more a second-comer takes of the original work, the 
more difficult it becomes to sustain a fair use defense.102 And even relatively 
minor uses of the work may count against fair use if the small amount used is 
the heart, or most important part, of the copyrighted work. But in considering 
factor three, the Campbell Court again pointed back to the transformative use 
concept, suggesting that parties making transformative uses of copyrighted 
works must often take the most important parts of well-known works to 
achieve their transformative purposes; they may also sometimes need to take 
substantial portions of the copyrighted work for those transformative purpos-
es.103 Hence, according to the Court, “the extent of permissible copying varies 
with the purpose and character of the use,” with transformative users having 
greater leeway in taking significant portions of copyrighted works (whether 
                                                                                                                 
 96 Dunn v. Brown, 517 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545 (D. Mass. 2007) (“[I]t is well settled that ‘facts’ 
cannot be copyrighted”). 
 97 See Hill, supra note 70, at 89 (stating that factual creations are afforded less copyright protec-
tion than creative works). 
 98 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. (noting that the creative nature of a work is of little help in transformative parody cas-
es). 
 102 Reddy, supra note 72, at 237. 
 103 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–88. 
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qualitatively or quantitatively) if the transformative purpose justifies that tak-
ing.104 
Finally, the Court also discussed the transformative use concept within its 
discussion of how to apply the fair use inquiry’s fourth factor. The Court noted 
that transformative uses of works are less likely to affect the potential market 
for or value of the original work.105 This is so because transformative uses, by 
creating a new work with a different meaning or purpose, are less likely to act 
as a substitute for the original work in the marketplace.106 Furthermore, even 
transformative uses that undermine the value of a copyrighted work by, say, 
critiquing or parodying it, are permissible.107 This is so because the fourth fac-
tor is meant to guard against uses that substitute for the original, not uses that 
happen to decrease the work’s value by, for instance, convincing the public that 
the work is not worthy of their pocketbooks.108 
These admonitions to take the transformative use concept into account 
when considering factors two through four are part of the Campbell Court’s 
more general instruction that courts should not treat the fair use factors “in iso-
lation, one from another.”109 Instead, the Court insisted, “[a]ll are to be ex-
plored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copy-
right.”110 But while the Court suggested in several instances such a broader 
role for the fourth factor, the Court failed to highlight factors two or three’s 
salience in any other part of the broader fair use inquiry.111 Instead, other than 
factor four, the Court reserved its especial attention for highlighting the trans-
formative use’s impact on each of the fair use factors, and on the overall fair 
use inquiry generally.112 
Courts since Campbell have increasingly taken these admonitions to heart 
in suffusing the entire fair use inquiry with inter-factor analyses, particularly 
with respect to the transformative use concept.113 Yet scholars studying fair use 
empirically have not tracked this reality, instead typically focusing on correla-
tions between overall fair use win rates and win rates for each of the factors 
and some of the more important subfactors such as transformative use. The 
                                                                                                                 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 590–94. 
 106 Id. at 593–94. 
 107 Id. at 591–92. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 578. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 587 (highlighting the fourth factor’s relevance in factor three’s assessment at least 
twice); id. at 580 n.14 (discussing the relevance of market substitution, the fourth factor’s concern, in 
the context of parody). 
 112 See id. at 579 (emphasizing the importance of transformativeness in the fair use inquiry). 
 113 Netanel, supra note 10, at 736–43. 
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next Section briefly reviews these studies and highlights some of this Article’s 
differences from them.114 
B. Empirically Studying Fair Use 
One of the more influential empirical assessments of fair use is Barton 
Beebe’s 2008 study.115 Beebe’s study is important for a number of reasons. For 
our purposes, its primary importance stems from it being one of the first stud-
ies to systematically analyze fair use case law. In contrast to the “anecdotal” 
approach to studying fair use, where scholars analyze leading fair use cases 
and derive conventional wisdom about fair use from them, Beebe’s study ana-
lyzed 306 reported116 fair use opinions between 1978 and 2005 and tracked a 
number of important metrics from each of those opinions.117 This Article does 
not include a full summary of the metrics Beebe tracked, but instead focuses 
on some of the more important ones in light of this study’s focus. 
One important metric Beebe’s study tracked was correlations between fair 
use findings and each of the four fair use factors.118 For instance, Beebe’s 
study finds that winning factor four is highly correlated with an overall fair use 
victory.119 Similarly, winning factor one also correlates with high overall fair 
use win rates (though in Beebe’s study, factor one is less highly correlated with 
the overall fair use outcome than factor four).120 Outcomes with respect to fac-
tors two and three, meanwhile, do not have as strong of a correlation with 
overall fair use outcomes, meaning that their resolution one way or the other 
may be less important to determining whether a use is fair.121 
But Beebe’s study goes beyond this macro view of fair use by delving in-
to an analysis of which subfactors within each factor seem to drive the out-
comes for each factor and, ultimately, the overall fair use question.122 As dis-
                                                                                                                 
 114 See infra notes 115–158 and accompanying text. 
 115 See generally Beebe, supra note 9, at 554–57 (summarizing the parts of his empirical study on 
fair use, which was the first such study at the time). 
 116 Id. at 564–65. Beebe was likely including cases reported by either Westlaw or Lexis, rather 
than only opinions reported as part of a hardcopy federal reporter, which is one meaning of the term 
“reported” that is often used. This is the most likely conclusion because the spreadsheet that Beebe used 
to track his opinions included several opinions that were unreported in this technical sense but that Lexis 
and/or Westlaw did “report” within their databases. See What Is the Difference Between “Unpublished” 
and “Unreported” Cases?, LEXIS ADVANCE, https://help.lexisnexis.com/tabula-rasa/newlexis/unpub-
lishedunreported_ref-reference?lbu=US&locale=en_US&audience=res [https://perma.cc/2XYA-HEP4] 
(explaining the distinction between unreported and unpublished cases). 
 117 Beebe, supra note 9, at 552–54. 
 118 Id. at 584–86. 
 119 Id. at 585–86. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 584. 
 122 Id. at 594–621. 
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cussed in Section A of this Part, at least the first three factors of the fair use test 
include various subfactors within them that courts often consider when resolv-
ing the fair use inquiry.123 Beebe’s study conducts a regression analysis with 
respect to many of these subfactors, including the transformative use concept, 
to better isolate which subfactors carry the most influence in resolving individ-
ual factor and overall fair use outcomes.124 
For instance, Beebe’s study shows that transformative use, when a court 
chooses to invoke the concept, plays a significant role in determining the out-
come with respect to both factor one and the overall fair use inquiry.125 His 
study, however, also indicates that a significant percentage of opinions fail to 
even reference the transformative use concept, let alone allow it to dictate reso-
lution of the fair use analysis.126 He goes on to test other subfactors within fac-
tor one, as well as those relating to factors two and three, to better isolate the 
impact of each of those subfactors.127 
Beebe also notes that courts do not tend to “stampede” results, meaning 
that most opinions called each factor “as they saw it.”128 For instance, rather 
than allowing a finding of fair use under factors one or four to dictate courts’ 
decisions on factors two and three, for the most part courts appear to simply 
decide each of those factors as the situation merits, even if a finding of fair use 
under factors one or four (or both) ultimately helps persuade the court to find 
fair use overall.129 Furthermore, Beebe specifically notes in his analysis of 
transformative use that a finding of transformative use typically does not result 
in courts conforming the rest of the factors to that finding—instead, they ap-
pear in most cases to decide the factors as they merit.130 
Yet a lack of stampeding, as Beebe defines it, does not mean that the 
transformative use concept (and other factors and subfactors within fair use 
more generally) do not influence the other factors’ outcomes, even when their 
outcomes differ from the transformative use outcomes. As discussed above, 
Campbell taught that courts should take into account the transformative use 
                                                                                                                 
 123 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
 124 Beebe, supra note 9, at 594–621. 
 125 Id. at 605. 
 126 Id. at 604–05. 
 127 Id. at 597–603 (assessing the commerciality subfactor); id. at 607–09 (assessing the bad faith 
inquiry); id. at 609–10 (assessing the preambular purposes inquiry); id. at 611–12 (assessing the crea-
tive/factual distinction); id. at 612–15 (assessing the published/unpublished inquiry); id. at 615–16 
(assessing the amount and substantiality of the use under factor three). 
 128 Id. at 590–91. 
 129 See id. at 606 (“[W]hile a finding of transformativeness may be dispositive of the outcome of 
the fair use test, such a finding does not stampede the outcomes of the other factors.”). 
 130 Id. 
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concept in assessing each of the fair use inquiry’s four factors.131 But there are 
a number of ways to do so without the type of stampeding that Beebe means. 
For instance, a court need not align the transformative use finding with the 
outcome of each of the other factors for de facto stampeding to occur. Courts 
may rule that a use is transformative and then, upon reviewing factor two, still 
decide that factor two disfavors fair use because the work is highly creative in 
nature. Yet in making such a ruling, the court may also rule that, in light of its 
transformative use finding, factor two carries very little weight in the overall 
fair use analysis.132 In fact, courts engage in this type of discounting frequently 
when a finding of transformative use coincides with uses of substantial por-
tions of highly creative works.133 Hence, stampeding by another name is often 
happening in such cases because the transformative use concept is still dictat-
ing resolution of those factors’ overall impact by effectively neutralizing them 
(whatever their outcomes may technically be). Yet Beebe’s and others’ studies 
fail to track this type of inter- and intra-factor influence—questions that this 
study addresses, among others. 
Subsequent to Beebe’s study, several other scholars took up the task of 
empirically assessing fair use and the transformative component thereof. Neil 
Netanel built on Beebe’s study by assessing five additional years of fair use 
case law.134 Netanel distinguished between the cases chronologically to argue 
that the fair use case law is more consistent and predictable than previous stud-
ies suggest.135 Beebe’s study, for instance, analyzed its 306 opinions as part of 
a single group of like cases, though Beebe did analyze some specific questions 
with chronological considerations in mind.136 Netanel’s insight is that lumping 
together opinions from different time periods inevitably leads to a seeming 
lack of consistency and predictability because that approach fails to explicitly 
                                                                                                                 
 131 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in isolation, 
one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright. . . . [T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the 
creation of transformative works.”). 
 132 Liu’s results provide additional support for this point. See Liu, supra note 15, at 168 (finding 
that courts tended to significantly discount factors two and three when the uses were deemed trans-
formative). 
 133 See, e.g., HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 99–100 (finding no market harm because the use was 
deemed transformative); Perfect 10, 2010 WL 9479060, at *12–13 (finding the third factor to be neu-
tral because Google’s use was transformative); Warren Publ’g, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (finding that 
though factor two disfavored fair use, its impact was limited because the use was transformative). 
 134 Netanel, supra note 10, at 731. 
 135 Id. at 719. 
 136 Beebe, supra note 9, at 554, 605. For instance, when assessing what percentage of opinions 
took transformative use into account, Beebe does distinguish between pre-Campbell and post-
Campbell opinions. Id. at 605. 
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take into account dramatic shifts in the fair use doctrine, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court.137 
For instance, clumping pre-Campbell and post-Campbell cases together in 
an empirical analysis is bound to manifest greater variance than warranted be-
cause courts applied quite different fair use standards in each of those time pe-
riods.138 Hence, Netanel’s study focuses on cases from 2006 to 2010—a time 
period, Netanel argues, during which the Supreme Court’s Campbell teachings 
had finally become more established in the case law.139 And during this time 
period, his study argues, courts became more consistent and predictable in ap-
plying the teachings of Campbell in their fair use decisions.140 For example, 
Netanel shows that the transformative use concept has not only made more 
frequent appearances in recent fair use cases, but also seems to dictate more 
completely the overall fair use question in this time period (and, presumably, 
going forward).141 
While helpful, Netanel’s study still lacks the empirical depth that this Ar-
ticle provides. For instance, missing from Netanel’s study are metrics relating 
to how frequently transformative use influences resolution of other parts of the 
fair use analysis, as well as other data that this study has collected relating to 
how courts define and apply the transformative use concept. Part II examines 
how this Article addresses this and other empirical gaps.142 Furthermore, 
Netanel’s empirical investigation ends in 2010, since which time courts have 
decided nearly a decade of important fair use and transformative use cases.143 
Pamela Samuelson and Matthew Sag have also conducted empirical stud-
ies of the fair use doctrine subsequent to Beebe’s investigation. Samuelson’s 
study seeks to make greater sense of the seeming incoherence of fair use case 
                                                                                                                 
 137 See Netanel, supra note 10, at 731 (indicating that “[a]dding an historical dimension [to a 
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trine’s legal development shows greater consistency than originally assumed). 
 139 Id. at 731. 
 140 Id. at 736–46. 
 141 Id. at 736–38. 
 142 See infra notes 159–263 and accompanying text. 
 143 Netanel, supra note 10, at 719. As noted earlier, a student Note recently looked at appellate 
fair use case law from 2010 to 2015. Tomassian, supra note 15, at 1352. That Note, however, focuses 
on a circuit split between the Second and Seventh Circuits, and only focuses on appellate cases and a 
narrower range of data. Id. at 1346, 1352–58. Anthony Reese has also looked at appellate opinions 
since Campbell. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 467, 485, 494 (2008). Although useful, the questions his study focused on are narrower 
than those that this study investigates. See id. at 467 (stating that his study is meant to determine 
“whether courts treat the fair use and derivative work issues as related”). His data collection also ends 
in 2007. Id. at 471. 
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law by creating a taxonomy of fair uses, or “policy-relevant clusters.”144 By 
creating this taxonomy, Samuelson shows that the seeming chaos of fair use 
case law exhibits a greater coherence than previous commentators had imag-
ined.145 Part of her taxonomy focuses on transformative uses, and she points to 
factors courts frequently consider when deciding whether a use counts as trans-
formative and fair use generally.146 Yet as with Beebe’s study, Samuelson’s 
study also fails to systematically track the type of inter-factor (and subfactor) 
interactions that this study examines, as well as the other transformative use 
data that this study has collected. Her study also ends a decade ago.147 
In his study, Matthew Sag takes a different approach to studying fair use 
than Beebe and Samuelson. His study focuses on better predicting fair use out-
comes based on case characteristics apparent to litigants prior to judicial reso-
lution.148 For instance, rather than focus on fair use outcomes and correlating 
those outcomes to outcomes for each factor and subfactor, Sag seeks to identi-
fy characteristics of the purported fair use and the parties involved in the case 
that help predict whether the court will ultimately decide that the use is fair.149 
His findings include the proposition that uses involving a “creative shift”—a 
partial proxy for transformative use—have significant predictive power as to 
whether a court will deem the use fair.150 “Direct commercial use”—another 
partial proxy for transformative use—also has significant predictive power as 
to whether a court will find a use to be a fair use, especially when combined 
with the “creative shift” consideration.151 
Sag’s findings are certainly helpful in isolating some of the impact of the 
transformative use concept and other factors within the fair use inquiry. But 
like the other studies discussed above,152 his study fails to explicitly and sys-
tematically capture the inter-factor influence that is apparent when reading fair 
use opinions. His findings are also based entirely on district court opinions 
between 1978 and 2011, and his proxies for transformative use, as he acknowl-
edges, do not capture all types of uses that courts may deem transformative.153 
This study, in contrast, includes both district and appellate court opinions 
spanning the life of the transformative use concept.154 Furthermore, this study 
                                                                                                                 
 144 Samuelson, supra note 15, at 2546. 
 145 Id. at 2541. 
 146 Id. at 2548–55. 
 147 See id. at 2539 (displaying the publication year of Samuelson’s article as 2009). 
 148 Sag, supra note 15, at 49, 51. 
 149 Id. at 49–51, 68. 
 150 Id. at 76–77. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See supra notes 115–147 and accompanying text. 
 153 Sag, supra note 15, at 52, 76–77. 
 154 See infra tbls.1–3. 
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includes a number of other transformative use (and fair use) metrics that ex-
pand upon Sag’s and others’ earlier findings.155 
Finally, shortly after completion of this study, Jiarui Liu published an em-
pirical assessment of the transformative use concept, covering transformative 
use case law through 2016.156 Some of his findings buttress those of this study, 
including the reality that courts tend to discount the importance of factors two, 
three, and four when courts find a use to be transformative.157 The present 
study provides additional data relating to this and other transformative use (and 
fair use) questions. The next Part lays out this study’s methodology and pre-
sents its primary findings.158 
II. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Section A of this Part provides details on this study’s methodology,159 and 
Section B presents this study’s most important findings.160 
A. Methodology 
This Article’s analysis is based on the results of a Westlaw advanced 
search for federal opinions containing the terms “fair use,” “copyright,” and 
“107” between the years 1991 and 2017.161 This study begins in 1991 because 
Judge Pierre N. Leval first coined the term “transformative use” in late 1990 in 
a now famous Harvard Law Review article,162 and a court first explicitly in-
voked the doctrine in 1991.163 Hence, because this study focuses on the trans-
                                                                                                                 
 155 See infra app. A and notes 215–243 and accompanying text. 
 156 Liu, supra note 15, at 166. 
 157 Id. at 167–68. 
 158 See infra notes 161–263 and accompanying text. 
 159 See infra notes 161–183 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 184–263 and accompanying text. 
 161 These search terms are the same as those used by Beebe in his earlier analysis. See Beebe, 
supra note 9, at 623 (explaining the search terms used in Lexis and Westlaw). The validity of the 
search string was confirmed by consulting with two separate Westlaw research attorneys. To replicate 
this search, perform an advanced search in Westlaw’s federal cases database using the following pa-
rameters: copyright & “fair use” & 107 & AD(aft 12-31-1990 & bef 09-14-2018) & DA(aft 12-31-
1990 & bef 01-01-2018). The latter parenthetical limits the results to opinions between 1991 and 
2017. The first parenthetical in the search string is necessary because Westlaw constantly adds opin-
ions to its databases, months or sometimes even years after they are first written. Hence, in order to 
ensure that future researchers could replicate the exact results, the first parenthetical was added to the 
search string, which limits the results to opinions added by Westlaw beginning in 1991 but before 
September 14, 2018, the first date of the initial search. 
 162 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 (1990). 
 163 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(defining “transformative use” by citing to Leval’s article and determining that the defendant’s use 
was not transformative but “a mere repackaging”); Netanel, supra note 10, at 724 (stating that the 
transformative use doctrine traces back to Leval’s article). 
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formative use concept, 1991 was the study’s logical starting point. The study 
ends in 2017 because it was the last complete year of data available when the 
study concluded. 
The initial search yielded 1,017 cases. The results were then narrowed to 
441 opinions164 by excluding: (1) opinions that mentioned the word “copy-
right” but did not concern an actual copyright issue;165 (2) opinions that men-
tioned but did not actually concern fair use;166 (3) opinions that failed to ex-
plicitly analyze at least two of the four fair use factors in rendering fair use 
decisions, because these conclusory opinions tended to provide little infor-
mation behind the courts’ decisions;167 and (4) opinions with non-substantive 
fair use outcomes. 
This final category of exclusions consists of opinions in which the court 
denied a party’s motion for dismissal or summary judgment because the court 
determined that too many outstanding factual issues remained for it to make a 
substantive determination.168 For instance, often a court denied a party’s mo-
tion for summary judgment on the issue of fair use because the court determined 
that it possessed insufficient evidence to decide the issue as a matter of law.169 
Instead, the court punted the issue to the jury for additional fact-finding.170 One 
might reasonably view this as a fair use outcome—the use was fair if the court 
denied the plaintiff’s motion, or not fair if the court denied the defendant’s. In 
fact, previous scholars appear to follow this approach in their studies.171 We 
chose to exclude these types of cases, however, because the court, in denying 
these types of motions, did not actually opine whether the use was fair or not. 
Instead, the court indicated in these situations that it could not definitively say 
one way or the other due to outstanding factual issues that a jury must further 
investigate and, ultimately, decide.172 
                                                                                                                 
 164 These opinions include those reported in a hardcopy federal reporter, as well as unpublished 
and unreported cases that Westlaw nonetheless made available through its electronic database. 
 165 For instance, a case may mention the word copyright but not actually be a case applying copy-
right law. Beebe made the same choice in his earlier study. See Beebe, supra note 9, at 623 (“A re-
search assistant then reviewed each of these opinions to exclude those that did not involve in any way 
an issue of copyright fair use.”). 
 166 For instance, a case may mention fair use in passing but not actually apply or analyze it. 
 167 Beebe made the same choice in his earlier study. See Beebe, supra note 9, at 623 (“Of the 307 
remaining opinions, 306 made substantial use of the section 107 four-factor test, which I defined as 
any use of the test that made reference, however briefly, to at least two test factors.”). 
 168 See, e.g., Basquiat v. Baghoomian, 1991 WL 253334, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1991). 
 169 See, e.g., id. (“However, where, as here, numerous issues of material fact remain in dispute, 
summary judgment would be inappropriate on the infringement issue.”). 
 170 See id. at *3 (explaining that the court cannot make a ruling until the factual issues are settled). 
 171 See Beebe, supra note 9, at 585 (counting a plaintiff’s summary judgment denial as a fair use 
finding); Netanel, supra note 10, at 755 (similar). 
 172 See, e.g., Basquiat, 1991 WL 253334, at *2 (“If sufficient facts are established for each of the 
four statutory factors, a court may determine as a matter of law whether the allegedly infringing con-
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The remaining 441 opinions are based on 416 cases, meaning that some 
of the cases yielded multiple distinct fair use opinions (e.g., separate opinions 
in the same case for different types of uses) as well as dissents and concurrenc-
es that included fair use opinions. The final tally thus consists of 441 opinions 
that include a substantive fair use outcome utilizing at least two of the four fair 
use factors. 
We then catalogued each of the 441 opinions based on seventy-one fac-
tors, including whether the court discussed the transformative use concept, 
outcomes for each fair use factor, and some of the more important subfactors 
such as transformative use. We also analyzed whether any factor (or the sub-
factors of factor one, including transformative use) appeared to explicitly af-
fect resolution of the other fair use factors. Section B of this Part presents the 
main findings.173 
Before turning to these results, we note several general limitations of this 
study. First, the data analysis is constrained by the reality that Westlaw may not 
provide access to the entire population of relevant fair use opinions. The com-
pany chooses to exclude some opinions from its database and it may never 
even encounter yet others.174 Furthermore, no combination of available data-
bases is likely to change this reality, because judges simply choose not to make 
some of their opinions available.175 As a result, we are left with a potentially 
imperfect universe of opinions for the 1991 to 2017 time period. We still elect-
ed to treat that universe as census data (i.e., the entire population of opinions 
meeting this study’s criteria) rather than a sample, because labeling something 
a probability sample entails random selection from a population, and there is 
certainly nothing random about our or Westlaw’s selection criteria.176 Because 
of this lack of randomization, we were reluctant to employ statistical tests of 
significance to the data that depend on a random sample being present.177 
                                                                                                                 
duct constitutes fair use. However, where, as here, numerous issues of material fact remain in dispute, 
summary judgment would be inappropriate on the infringement issue.”) (citation omitted). 
 173 See infra notes 184–263 and accompanying text. 
 174 See generally Ellen Platt, Unpublished vs. Unreported: What’s the Difference?, 5 PERSPEC-
TIVES 26, 26–27 (1996) (discussing how Westlaw and Lexis choose which opinions go into their da-
tabases). 
 175 Id. at 27. 
 176 See Sampling, YALE STAT. DEP’T, http://www.stat.yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/sample.htm 
[https://perma.cc/F2H8-7V4X] (explaining that when utilizing the “random sampling” technique, 
“[e]ach individual is chosen entirely by chance and each member of the population has an equal 
chance of being included in the sample”). 
 177 See generally Lisa Sullivan, Confidence Intervals, B.U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://sphweb.
bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/BS/BS704_Confidence_Intervals/BS704_Confidence_Intervals_
print.html [https://perma.cc/KC4A-DJSN] (noting the importance of randomization for drawing valid 
statistical inferences). 
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Thus, with a few exceptions,178 we present the study’s results as metrics relat-
ing to the entire population of opinions meeting the study’s criteria at the time 
of the Westlaw search, with the caveat that it is possible that Westlaw does not 
include some relevant opinions. 
Second, as with previous studies, this study’s opinion data are not repre-
sentative of all fair use opinions because of the chosen parameters.179 For in-
stance, we chose to only include those opinions that rely on at least two of the 
four fair use factors in rendering a substantive fair use outcome. While we be-
lieve this choice has merit, it does mean that some selection bias is inherent in 
the data. Furthermore, the opinions in this study’s dataset are not representative 
of cases before 1991. This latter limitation is a virtue in some respects, howev-
er, because in certain regards fair use case law prior to 1991 is increasingly 
irrelevant given the transformative use paradigm’s ascendance. 
Indeed, despite these limitations, this study’s results provide a number of 
important insights about the fair use and transformative use doctrines’ evolu-
tion.180 The dataset includes practically all relevant opinions for the specified 
time period because Westlaw focuses on including all substantive cases in its 
database and attempts to be thorough in doing so.181 Furthermore, whatever else 
might be said, opinions reported through services like Westlaw remain “the 
most salient indication of what fair use doctrine is.”182 With these thoughts in 
mind, Section B presents this study’s results.183 
B. Results 
The following Section presents evidence supporting the argument that 
transformative use is eating the world of fair use. This evidence consists of at 
least the following two realities. First, courts increasingly rely on the trans-
formative use concept in their opinions.184 And second, when a court uses the 
transformative use concept, the doctrine frequently appears to dictate the 
                                                                                                                 
 178 The exceptions apply where the research team conducted regression analysis. In those cases, 
we treated the data as a sample of a theoretical infinite population. 
 179 Furthermore, the data are not representative of all the work the fair use doctrine does because 
many disputes simply never get litigated. See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Law-
yers’ Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 572 (2013) (“Settlement is a critical as-
pect of civil litigation. Although the exact settlement rate is unclear, most cases settle.”). 
 180 See infra notes 186–213 and accompanying text. 
 181 Platt, supra note 174, at 26–27. 
 182 Netanel, supra note 10, at 733. For a helpful overview of biases inherent in this type of study 
in general, see id. at 730–34. 
 183 See infra notes 184–263 and accompanying text. 
 184 See infra tbls.1–3. 
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court’s analysis of the remaining factors and, ultimately, the overall fair use 
outcome.185 
1. How Frequently Do Courts Consider Transformative Use? 
One important figure to consider at the outset is the percentage of opin-
ions that employ the transformative use concept. After all, if a large proportion 
of courts fail to even utilize the transformative use doctrine, it becomes diffi-
cult to argue that transformative use is eating the fair use world. 
In his earlier study, Beebe makes precisely this point, arguing that com-
mentators have exaggerated the extent to which the transformative use para-
digm dictates fair use case law.186 He backs up this claim by highlighting that 
about forty-one percent of post-Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. district 
court opinions in his dataset fail to invoke the transformative use concept, 
while nearly nineteen percent of post-Campbell appellate opinions omit a dis-
cussion of transformative use.187 He also indicates that the transformative use 
doctrine “appears to be losing strength,” pointing out that the relative number 
of opinions utilizing the doctrine began to decline in the early 2000s.188 
In his follow-up study to Beebe, Netanel argues that part of the reason 
behind Beebe’s results is that Beebe’s study relies on data that include periods 
of time when the transformative use paradigm was not yet fully entrenched in 
the case law.189 In support of this point, Netanel indicates that the percentage 
of opinions making use of the transformative use concept has risen since 
Beebe’s study, particularly between the years 2006 and 2010.190 
Before looking at this study’s data, we note a general disagreement with 
Beebe’s interpretation of his earlier dataset.191 In our view, the fact that over 
eighty-one percent of post-Campbell appellate opinions and nearly sixty per-
cent of district court opinions in his dataset explicitly considered transforma-
tive use192 is actually strong evidence that transformative use is one of the most 
dominant considerations in fair use case law. Transformative use may not play 
                                                                                                                 
 185 See infra app. A and notes 215–243 and accompanying text. It should be noted that many of 
the statistics offered in support of this argument are correlations and are not meant to suggest that the 
reported correlations are somehow equivalent to causation. This issue is discussed in greater detail 
below, particularly in the regression results reporting. See infra notes 215–230 and accompanying 
text. 
 186 Beebe, supra note 9, at 604–05. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 605. 
 189 Netanel, supra note 10, at 736–37. 
 190 Id. at 736. 
 191 See Beebe, supra note 9, at 604 (“It appears . . . that courts and commentators have exaggerat-
ed the influence of transformativeness doctrine on our fair use case law.”). 
 192 Id. at 604–05. 
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a role in every fair use case for any number of reasons.193 But that is no differ-
ent than for any other factor or subfactor within the fair use inquiry—in this 
study’s review of fair use case law, courts often chose to omit various factors 
and subfactors from their fair use discussions. The fact that transformative use 
shows up in fair use discussions so frequently, despite neither the Supreme 
Court nor the Copyright Act mandating it, is thus evidence of its significance. 
This study’s updated data show that transformative use plays a vital role 
in the vast majority of both district and appellate decisions, with that role be-
coming more pronounced over time. Overall, courts discussed transformative 
use in a little over seventy-one percent of all opinions. When excluding pre-
Campbell opinions, however, the percentage of opinions that considered trans-
formative use rises to nearly eighty percent.194 And when only considering 
opinions from 2011 to 2017, nearly ninety percent of all opinions applied the 
transformative use doctrine. Liu’s recent study presents similar results.195 Ta-
bles 1 through 3 below summarize these findings. 
 
Table 1. Breakdown of Fair Use Opinions by Court Level and Use of the  
Transformative Use Doctrine, 1991–2017. 
 Fair Use Opinions Trans. Use Opinions % Trans. Use Opinions 
District 346 246 71.10% 
Appellate 95 69 72.63% 
Total 441 315 71.43% 
 
 
Table 2. Breakdown of Post-Campbell Fair Use Opinions by Court Level  
and Use of the Transformative Use Doctrine. 
 Fair Use Opinions Trans. Use Opinions % Trans. Use Opinions 
District 310 242 78.06% 
Appellate 84 67 79.76% 
Total 394 309 78.43% 
                                                                                                                 
 193 One important reason is that the Supreme Court did not absolutely mandate it, indicating that 
“transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). For this reason, some litigants may not even raise the issue and 
courts may therefore not consider it in their opinions. 
 194 Like studies by some previous scholars, this study includes a few opinions that applied the 
transformative use concept, even if those opinions did not explicitly use the term “transformative use.” 
See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 10, at 737. 
 195 Liu, supra note 15, at 166. 
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Table 3. Breakdown of Fair Use Opinions by Court Level and Use of  
the Transformative Use Doctrine, 2011–2017. 
 Fair Use Opinions Trans. Use Opinions % Trans. Use Opinions 
District 127 115 90.55% 
Appellate 26 21 80.77% 
Total 153 136 88.89% 
As Table 1 also shows, overall appellate and district court opinions were 
nearly equal in how frequently they considered transformative use. This is a 
significant change from previous empirical assessments, which found that dis-
trict courts significantly lagged behind appellate courts in applying the trans-
formative use doctrine.196 In fact, between 2011 and 2017, Table 3 shows that 
district courts actually outpaced appellate courts in relying on the transforma-
tive use doctrine. 
Collectively, these three tables thus point to at least two important find-
ings. First, over time there has been a steady progression of both appellate and 
district courts adopting the transformative use paradigm, with modern courts 
relying on it nearly ninety percent of the time. This data helps substantiate 
Netanel’s earlier claim that it took some time for the transformative use doc-
trine to become entrenched in the case law.197 But entrenched the doctrine now 
is, with modern courts nearly always invoking it. Transformative use may not 
always eat the world of fair use, but in today’s world, it almost always has a 
seat at the table. 
Second, as indicated above, district courts have caught up with, and even 
surpassed, appellate courts in utilizing the transformative use doctrine. This is 
significant because so few district court cases ever make their way before an 
appellate decisionmaker.198 Indeed, in some respects transformative use met-
rics at the district level are even more important than those at the appellate lev-
el. And this study’s metrics indicate that in modern district courts, the trans-
formative use paradigm reigns supreme. 
2. Which Courts Utilize Transformative Use the Most? 
It is also worth considering whether courts within particular federal cir-
cuits embrace the transformative use paradigm more than others. Similar to 
previous studies, opinions from district and appellate courts within the Second 
and Ninth Circuits dominate this study.199 Nearly a quarter of this study’s opin-
                                                                                                                 
 196 Beebe, supra note 9, at 604–05; Netanel, supra note 10, at 736. 
 197 Netanel, supra note 10, at 736–37. 
 198 Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 659–60. 
 199 Beebe, supra note 9, at 568–69; Netanel, supra note 10, at 732. 
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ions comes from district and appellate courts within the Second Circuit, where 
Judge Pierre Leval, the transformative use concept’s originator, currently re-
sides as a senior circuit judge.200 Meanwhile, thirty-one percent of the opinions 
come from courts within the Ninth Circuit. The next closest to either of these 
behemoths is the Eleventh Circuit (about seven percent of the opinions stud-
ied). Table 4 below provides these and additional details. 
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of how much the Second and 
Ninth Circuits dominate fair use case law in this study’s dataset. 
                                                                                                                 
 200 Leval, supra note 162, at 1111–12; Netanel, supra note 10, at 724; Pierre N. Leval, U.S. CT. 
APPEALS FOR SECOND CIR., http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judges/bios/pnl.html [https://perma.cc/
BXL2-P9C8]. 
Table 4. Number and Percentage of Fair Use Opinions by Circuit. 
 Number of Opinions Percentage of Total Opinions 
1st Cir. 15 3.40% 
2d Cir. 110 24.94% 
3d Cir. 16 3.63% 
4th Cir. 31 7.03% 
5th Cir. 17 3.85% 
6th Cir. 31 7.03% 
7th Cir. 23 5.22% 
8th Cir. 11 2.49% 
9th Cir. 137 31.07% 
10th Cir. 12 2.72% 
11th Cir. 32 7.26% 
D.C. Cir. 3 0.68% 
Fed. Cir. 3 0.68% 
Total 441 100.00% 
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Figure 1. Fair Use Opinions by Circuit. 
 
While the Ninth and Second Circuits dominate fair use case law, opinions 
from courts in those circuits have not universally adopted the transformative 
use paradigm. This study’s data indicate that courts within the Second Circuit 
utilize transformative use in a little over three-quarters of their opinions, while 
courts within the Ninth Circuit do so at a slightly higher clip. One might rea-
sonably expect that opinions emanating from courts in the Second Circuit 
would have even higher percentages of transformative use adoption, because 
the concept’s originator, Judge Leval, is a senior judge on that circuit. But it 
appears that about a quarter of the time, Judge Leval’s colleagues choose to 
ignore his magnum opus. It is worth noting, however, that these overall per-
centages increase for opinions from both circuits when excluding pre-
Campbell opinions: a little over eighty-seven percent for opinions from within 
the Second Circuit, and a little over eighty-four percent for opinions from 
within the Ninth Circuit. 
When looking at opinions from other circuits, the percentage of opinions 
that adopt the transformative use paradigm seems somewhat sporadic. Indeed, 
the small number of opinions within these circuits makes drawing broad con-
clusions based on these percentages difficult. Table 5 and Figure 2 summarize 
these findings. 
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Table 5. Number and Percentage of Transformative Use Opinions by Circuit. 
 Fair Use Opinions Trans. Use Opinions % Trans. Use 
1st Cir. 15 11 73.33% 
2d Cir. 110 84 76.36% 
3d Cir. 16 12 75.00% 
4th Cir. 31 19 61.29% 
5th Cir. 17 9 52.94% 
6th Cir. 31 17 54.84% 
7th Cir. 23 17 73.91% 
8th Cir. 11 8 72.73% 
9th Cir. 137 108 78.83% 
10th Cir. 12 4 33.33% 
11th Cir. 32 23 71.88% 
D.C. Cir. 3 1 33.33% 
Fed. Cir. 3 2 66.67% 
Total 441 315 71.43% 
 
Figure 2. Graphical Depiction of Transformative Use Adoption by Circuit. 
 
Suffice it to say that these data, on their own, do not fully explain how 
courts within different circuits approach the transformative use question. But 
supplementing them with other information gleaned from the opinions can 
help. For instance, though opinions in the Seventh and Second Circuits appear 
to adopt the transformative use paradigm in near equal measure, judges in the 
Seventh Circuit have recently begun to criticize overreliance on the transform-
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ative use concept, identifying the Second Circuit as the fosterer of this errone-
ous emphasis.201 In fact, some of the opinions from the Seventh Circuit that 
use the transformative use concept (and thus count towards increasing the Sev-
enth Circuit’s adoption rate) mostly do so in order to criticize the role the doc-
trine plays in fair use jurisprudence, in several instances labeling the term 
“confusing.”202 Hence, opinion data spanning the transformative use concept’s 
entire history mask a growing divergence in approaches to transformative use, 
with the Seventh Circuit in particular appearing to be moving away from the 
concept. If these divergences continue, they may ultimately force the Supreme 
Court to revisit the fair use doctrine and transformative use concept within it, 
something the Court has not done since its 1994 Campbell decision.203 
3. What Sources Do Courts Use in Defining and Applying the 
Transformative Use Concept? 
Much has been made about what the transformative use term even 
means.204 The Supreme Court’s definition in Campbell—a use that “alter[s] the 
[original] with new expression, meaning, or message”—is quite open-ended.205 
Furthermore, the Campbell Court applied the transformative use concept in the 
specific context of a parody.206 But most subsequent courts have been forced to 
apply the transformative use doctrine outside of that context.207 In fact, this 
study’s data show that of the transformative use opinions subsequent to Camp-
bell, only about fifteen percent grappled specifically with whether the use in-
                                                                                                                 
 201 See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (deciding to forgo 
the transformative use inquiry and instead exclusively look to 17 U.S.C. § 107 because “the Second 
Circuit do[es] not explain how every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without extinguishing the 
author’s rights”); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (indicating that the 
transformative use term is confusing); Campinha-Bacote v. Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 2015 
WL 12559889, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2015) (stating that the case demonstrates why the Seventh 
Circuit finds the transformative use term “confusing” despite the Second Circuit’s reliance on the 
doctrine). 
 202 Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 518; Campinha-Bacote, 2015 WL 12559889, at *4. 
 203 In fact, the Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a copyright case that involves the fair use 
doctrine. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Google and Oracle Copyright Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/supreme-court-google-oracle.html [https://perma.
cc/ZDG5-7779]. 
 204 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 10, at 746–47 (summarizing some of this literature on the debate 
surrounding the definition of transformative use). 
 205 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying the trans-
formative use doctrine in the context of a database); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 
1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying the transformative use doctrine in the context of thumbnail im-
ages). 
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volved parody. Therefore, courts following in Campbell’s wake have neces-
sarily wrestled with refining the concept in a variety of non-parodic contexts. 
In doing so, what sources have courts relied on? The Campbell decision is 
one obvious candidate, and the data confirm that nearly eighty-six percent of 
transformative use opinions cite Campbell in applying the transformative use 
concept. By comparison, Judge Leval, the person responsible for coining the 
phrase, is cited in only about fifteen percent of the opinions in this study. 
Given the Second and Ninth Circuits’ significant shares of fair use and 
transformative use opinions, it is also worth investigating to what extent other 
circuits follow their transformative use lead. As noted above, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has recently pushed back against the Second Circuit’s approach to trans-
formative use.208 But do other circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, rely on 
opinions emanating from the Second and Ninth Circuits in defining and apply-
ing transformative use in their own cases? 
The answer is in the affirmative. Nearly thirty-five percent of opinions 
emanating from courts outside the Second Circuit cite Second Circuit case law 
when defining and applying the transformative use concept. When adding the 
Second Circuit’s self-citations to its own transformative use case law, the per-
centage rises to forty-six percent. Courts within the Ninth Circuit, itself a 
heavyweight in defining the transformative use doctrine, cite the Second Cir-
cuit a little over twenty-nine percent of the time. And even courts within the 
Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit’s self-declared transformative use antago-
nist,209 cite Second Circuit case law fifty-nine percent of the time when defin-
ing and applying the transformative use doctrine. In fact, courts within the 
Seventh Circuit cite Second Circuit transformative case law more frequently 
than their own. 
The Ninth Circuit also boasts a significant percentage of opinions outside 
of it which rely on its transformative use case law: nearly twenty-seven percent 
of non-Ninth Circuit opinions cite Ninth Circuit case law when defining and 
applying the transformative use concept. When self-citations are factored in, 
Ninth Circuit case law is cited in about forty-two percent of all transformative 
use opinions. The Second Circuit also regularly patronizes Ninth Circuit case 
law when defining and applying transformative use, with twenty-three percent 
of Second Circuit court opinions citing to Ninth Circuit transformative use 
opinions. Overall, when we look at the entire set of non-Ninth and Second Cir-
cuit opinions, over fifty-three percent of them rely on either Ninth or Second 
                                                                                                                 
 208 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758; Campinha-Bacote, 2015 WL 12559889, at *4. 
 209 See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 215–16 n.18 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The Seventh 
Circuit takes the position that the kind of secondary use that favors satisfaction of the fair use test is 
better described as a ‘complementary’ use . . . . We do not find the term ‘complementary’ particularly 
helpful in explaining fair use.”) (citation omitted). 
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Circuit opinions (or both) in defining and applying the transformative use doc-
trine. Table 6 below provides a breakdown of how often courts within each 
circuit cite various sources in defining and applying transformative use. 
As Table 6 shows, no other circuits come close to the Second and Ninth 
Circuits in how frequently other circuits cite their transformative use case law. 
For instance, the Seventh Circuit’s deemphasis of the transformative use doctrine 
remains a clear minority position, at least as shown by how infrequently courts 
outside the Seventh Circuit cite Seventh Circuit transformative use case law 
(three percent of the time; self-citations within the Seventh Circuit double that 
circuit’s percentage to a little over six percent). This low rate is not terribly sur-
prising, in part because the Seventh Circuit’s push against the transformative use 
doctrine is of somewhat recent origin.210 Courts from other circuits may eventu-
ally choose to follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead. But, at least for now, the Second 
and Ninth Circuits are the clear leaders in defining and applying the transforma-
tive use doctrine, both within their own circuits and more broadly. 
 
Table 6. Percentage of Opinions by Circuit That Cite to Various Transformative Use Sources. 
  1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th D.C. Fed. Total 
 Acuff 82 92 83 68 100 82 88 100 84 100 74 100 100 86 
 Leval 0 37 8 26 11 0 12 0 5 0 4 0 0 15 
 S.C. 55 10 0 16 11 6 12 25 7 0 9 0 0 10 
1st 36 2 8 0 0 0 12 12 8 0 13 0 0 7 
 2d 36 76 17 68 44 12 59 38 29 50 30 0 100 46 
3d 0 2 25 0 0 0 12 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4th 0 6 8 63 11 0 0 12 4 0 4 0 0 8 
5th 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6th 0 1 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
7th 9 6 8 0 0 0 53 12 1 0 0 0 0 6 
8th 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 1 
9th 27 23 33 32 44 12 35 50 70 0 30 0 0 42 
                                                                                                                 
 210 See, e.g., Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (criticizing the transformative use doctrine); Campinha-
Bacote, 2015 WL 12559889, at *4 (stating that the transformative use term is “confusing”). The first 
opinion from a court within the Seventh Circuit that appears to put the transformative use doctrine in 
question came in 2002. Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 518 (“The distinction between complementary and substi-
tutional copying (sometimes—though as it seems to us, confusingly—said to be between ‘transforma-
tive’ and ‘superseding’ copies) is illustrated not only by the difference between quotations from a 
book in a book review and the book itself, but also by the difference between parody (fair use) and 
burlesque (often not fair use).”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). But calling something confusing 
is not a clear renunciation of the concept. That renunciation comes across most clearly in Kienitz. See 
766 F.3d at 758 (criticizing the Second Circuit’s emphasis on transformative use, while expressing the 
opinion that “[w]e think it best to stick with the statutory list”). 
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10th 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
11th 0 6 0 5 11 0 6 0 2 0 39 0 0 6 
D.C. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Fed. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 Other 0 7 0 0 0 6 6 12 3 0 4 0 0 4 
 
Note: The values in this table are percentages. The row headings refer to the source cited. The column 
headings refer to the citing circuit. 
Some circuits do not even have their own transformative use case law on 
which to rely. For instance, this study only includes eleven opinions from 
courts within the Eighth Circuit, all of which are district court opinions. Eight 
of these eleven opinions apply the transformative use concept, and only two of 
those eight cite Eighth Circuit case law when doing so. Furthermore, each of 
those citations is to a sole Eighth Circuit district court opinion; apparently the 
Eighth Circuit has never issued a transformative use appellate opinion worthy 
of citation by Eighth Circuit courts.211 Indeed, it is astonishing that in the near-
ly twenty-six years that this study spans, not once has the Eighth Circuit issued 
an appellate opinion applying the transformative use doctrine. Meanwhile, 
Fifth Circuit case law has never been cited in defining and applying the trans-
formative use doctrine outside of the Fifth Circuit, and only once within it.212 
Hence, when modern courts discuss what “transformative use” means, 
they more often than not do so in the context of the Campbell definition, as 
further refined by courts within the Second and Ninth Circuits. This Article 
discusses in greater detail below data that help us better understand what ex-
actly that means.213 But for now, suffice it to say that the Second and Ninth 
Circuits dominate that discussion relative to other circuits, such as the Seventh, 
that may wish to have a greater say in the matter. 
4. When Courts Use the Transformative Use Concept, What Role Does It 
Play? 
a. Transformative Use by the Numbers 
Having examined how frequently courts utilize transformative use and 
what sources they rely on in doing so, this Article now turns to some of the most 
important findings in this study: how frequently do transformative users win? 
                                                                                                                 
 211 That sole district court opinion is Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980 
(D. Minn. 2003). 
 212 See Peteski Prods., Inc. v. Rothman, 264 F. Supp. 3d 731, 736 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (citing Trian-
gle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 213 See infra notes 214–243 and accompanying text. 
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Overall, a little over fifty percent of the opinions in this study found the 
use to be fair. Table 7 breaks this total out by the circuit—whether a district or 
appellate court—in which the opinion writer sits. Overall win rates in the Sec-
ond Circuit are above average, while in the Ninth Circuit fair use win rates are 
below average. Astonishingly, defendants in the Fourth Circuit won their fair 
use arguments about three-quarters of the time. 
Table 7. Overall Fair Use Win Rates by Circuit. 
 Not Fair Fair Total Win Rate 
1st Cir. 8 7 15 46.67% 
2d Cir. 46 64 110 58.18% 
3d Cir. 9 7 16 43.75% 
4th Cir. 8 23 31 74.19% 
5th Cir. 11 6 17 35.29% 
6th Cir. 15 16 31 51.61% 
7th Cir. 12 11 23 47.83% 
8th Cir. 6 5 11 45.45% 
9th Cir. 75 62 137 45.26% 
10th Cir. 8 4 12 33.33% 
11th Cir. 17 15 32 46.88% 
D.C. Cir. 3 0 3 0.00% 
Fed. Cir. 1 2 3 66.67% 
Total 219 222 441 50.34% 
Of the opinions that utilized the transformative use concept, the win rate 
was slightly lower than the overall fair use win rate. Hence, the mere fact that 
an opinion discusses transformative use does not appear to increase a party’s 
odds that the opinion’s author will find the use to be fair. In fact, as the lower 
overall fair use win rate for transformative use opinions suggests, win rates in 
some circuits are actually lower when the court considers transformative use. 
Fair use win rates in the Second Circuit, for instance, are three percent lower 
when only looking at transformative use opinions.214 Ninth Circuit rates of fair 
use success are also slightly lower when only considering opinions that apply 
the transformative use doctrine. Even the Fourth Circuit’s high fair use win 
rate dips slightly when only examining those opinions that address the trans-
formative use concept. 
Hence, transformative use may be eating the fair use world by playing a 
role in increasingly more fair use opinions. But this study’s data, on their face, 
do not suggest that when courts rely on the transformative use concept, the fair 
use outcome is favorably predetermined in any way. Table 8 below breaks 
                                                                                                                 
 214 In fact, when only looking at Second Circuit opinions that do not take transformative use into 
account, the win rate is a little over sixty-five percent. 
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down by circuit overall fair use win rates for only opinions that utilize the 
transformative use doctrine, regardless of whether the opinion found the use 
transformative. 
Table 8. Overall Fair Use Win Rates by Circuit in Opinions That Consider 
Transformative Use. 
 Trans. Use Opinions Not Fair Fair Win Rate 
1st Cir. 11 7 4 36.36% 
2d Cir. 84 37 47 55.95% 
3d Cir. 12 8 4 33.33% 
4th Cir. 19 5 14 73.68% 
5th Cir. 9 5 4 44.44% 
6th Cir. 17 9 8 47.06% 
7th Cir. 17 8 9 52.94% 
8th Cir. 8 4 4 50.00% 
9th Cir. 108 60 48 44.44% 
10th Cir. 4 3 1 25.00% 
11th Cir. 23 11 12 52.17% 
D.C. Cir. 1 1 0 0.00% 
Fed. Cir. 2 1 1 50.00% 
Total 315 159 156 49.52% 
None of this is to suggest, however, that the transformative use outcome 
is immaterial to the overall fair use determination. Far from it. Of the 315 
opinions that made use of the transformative use concept, 152 found the use to 
be transformative (a little over forty-eight percent). Of these 152 opinions, 138 
(nearly ninety-one percent) also found the overall outcome to be fair. In the 
two most important copyright circuits—the Ninth and the Second—the win 
rates for transformative users are even higher. In other circuits, the win rate for 
transformative users is one hundred percent. Table 9 below breaks these opin-
ions out by the circuit in which the opinion writer sits. 
Table 9. Win Rates by Circuit for Transformative Users. 






Win Rate for 
Trans. Users 
1st Cir. 11 6 4 66.67% 
2d Cir. 84 46 43 93.48% 
3d Cir. 12 4 4 100.00% 
4th Cir. 19 13 13 100.00% 
5th Cir. 9 4 3 75.00% 
6th Cir. 17 6 5 83.33% 
7th Cir. 17 9 8 88.89% 
8th Cir. 8 4 4 100.00% 
9th Cir. 108 49 45 91.84% 
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Relatedly, parties that lose the transformative use inquiry rarely win the 
fair use inquiry. Of the 161 such opinions, only sixteen defendants (about ten 
percent) emerged victorious on fair use overall. These win rates for defendants 
were low regardless of whether the opinion came from a district or appellate 
court judge, though this study’s data suggest appellate courts were slightly 
more likely to deem a use fair even if the use was not transformative. 
b. Regression Results 
While these win rates are interesting in their own right, this study also in-
cludes regression analysis to better isolate which fair use factors and subfactors 
appear to have the most significant role in influencing fair use outcomes. Table 
10 below provides the regression results when examining overall fair use out-
comes as a function of the four statutory fair use factors. Essentially, this table 
shows which of the fair use factors appears to be the most influential in deter-
mining fair use outcomes. Similar to previous studies, it shows that outcomes for 
factors one, three, and four exhibit statistically significant relationships with the 
overall fair use outcome, while factor two does not.215 As with previous stud-
ies, factor four, with the largest odds ratio and coefficient value, appears to 
exert the strongest influence on fair use outcomes, though factors one and three 
appear to have made up some ground.216 In fact, contrary to previous studies, 
in this study’s model factor three even slightly outpaces factor one in its over-
all relationship to fair use outcomes.217 
                                                                                                                 
 215 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 9, at 586 (stating that factor two has very little impact on the out-
come of the fair use test); Sag, supra note 15, at 77 (stating that the nature of the work, the second 
factor, did not appear to have any influence in predicting the outcome of fair use). 
 216 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 9, at 586 (“[T]he first and fourth factors are shown each to exert 
an enormous amount of influence on the outcome of the test, with the fourth very much in the driver’s 
seat.”); Liu, supra note 15, at 181 (“[F]actor one and factor four highly correlate with fair use out-
come.”). But see Netanel, supra note 10, at 743–44 (“Data regarding judicial treatment of the fourth 
factor in general further supports the conclusion that the market paradigm no longer asserts a hold on 
fair use case law.”). 
 217 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 9, at 586 (stating that factors one and four, compared to the other 
factors, appear to have the largest influence on a fair use outcome, at least at a macro level); Liu, su-
pra note 15, at 181 (stating that factor one has a larger correlation with a fair use outcome than factor 
three). 
10th Cir. 4 1 1 100.00% 
11th Cir. 23 9 7 77.78% 
D.C. Cir. 1 0 0 N/A 
Fed. Cir. 2 1 1 100.00% 
Total 315 152 138 90.79% 
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Table 10. Logistic Regression of the Outcome of the Fair Use Defense as a Function of 
the Four Statutory Factors in 441 Dispositive Opinions.218 
 Odds Ratio* Coefficient Standard Error Z Value p-value 
Intercept 1.694 0.527 0.463 1.139 0.255 
Factor 1 8.229 2.108 0.371 5.674 0.000 
Factor 2 1.857 0.619 0.378 1.637 0.102 
Factor 3 9.228 2.222 0.588 3.777 0.000 
Factor 4 13.406 2.596 0.428 6.058 0.000 
*Boldface denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
But as Beebe has previously noted, analyzing fair use outcomes at this 
level of abstraction may not actually explain much in terms of what drives 
those outcomes.219 For instance, though factor four appears to be the most in-
fluential on overall fair use outcomes, Beebe has rightly pointed out that judg-
es rarely actually make factual findings under factor four.220 Instead, judges 
often synthesize their findings under the first three factors when deciding 
whether factor four favors fair use.221 Thus, because factor four often functions 
as a quasi-conclusion of the court’s reasoning under the earlier fair use factors, 
it is not terribly surprising that outcomes for factor four, more than any other 
factor, often prove to be the best predictor of overall fair use outcomes. 
So which factors actually drive fair use outcomes? Beebe, in his earlier 
study, makes the case that examining each factor’s subfactors helps get us 
closer to the truth, in part because doing so moves us away from high levels of 
abstraction to the court’s actual findings under each factor.222 He then finds 
that factor one’s subfactors are the most influential in terms of predicting fair 
use outcomes.223 And of those factor one subfactors, he finds that when a court 
invokes the transformative use subfactor, it exerts near dispositive force on not 
only factor one’s resolution, but on the fair use outcome more generally.224 
                                                                                                                 
 218 For logistic regression models, the closer the Pseudo R^2 value is to 1, the better the model is 
in explaining the observed variation. Hence, the Pseudo R^2 value of 0.887 for this regression sug-
gests high statistical reliability. Furthermore, the model accurately classified over ninety-seven per-
cent of the observations. 
 219 Beebe, supra note 9, at 586. 
 220 Id. at 621. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See id. at 594 (“Having established . . . a macro view of the section 107 test and the factors 
that structure it, I seek . . . to look within the factors themselves to determine which subfactor consid-
erations drive the outcomes of the factors, and through these factor outcomes, the outcome of the 
overall test.”). 
 223 Id. at 595. As a reminder, factor one’s most typical subfactors include assessing whether the 
defendant’s use is commercial or noncommercial, whether the use is transformative, and whether the 
defendant used the work in bad faith. Id. 
 224 Id. 
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This study’s data confirm some of these earlier findings, while also ex-
panding on them. First, this study’s regression results, the remainder of which 
are presented in Appendix A, confirm that transformative use outcomes have a 
statistically significant relationship to overall fair use outcomes.225 This study’s 
results also show that the transformative use-fair use relationship is stronger 
than the relationships that other factor one subfactors have with the overall fair 
use outcome.226 Put simply, these statistical results show that fair use outcomes 
tend to follow transformative use outcomes more than any other factor one 
subfactor. And because factor one’s subfactors are the most significant in the 
overall fair use inquiry in terms of impact, these findings further cement the 
transformative use doctrine’s status as leader of the subfactor pack.227 
Beyond this, we also tested whether transformative use outcomes exhibit-
ed statistically significant relationships to outcomes for factors one, three, and 
four. This is useful to know because, as discussed above, how courts resolve 
each of these factors appears to play an important role in how courts resolve 
the overall fair use question.228 Hence, determining which subfactors have the 
strongest relationships to each of these factors’ outcomes also better elucidates 
the role that transformative use plays in fair use doctrine more generally. 
Again, this study’s regression results in Appendix A provide additional 
evidence in support of the argument that transformative use is eating the world 
of fair use. Transformative use outcomes exhibit a statistically significant rela-
tionship to outcomes for factors one, three, and four, each of which plays a 
major role in determining fair use outcomes.229 And the transformative use 
doctrine’s role in influencing outcomes for each of these factors appears to be 
greater than any of the other factor one subfactors, traditionally thought of as 
the most significant fair use subfactors.230 This all means that outcomes for 
factors one, three, and four tend to follow the transformative use doctrine’s 
lead more than outcomes for any of the other factor one subfactors. 
In light of these findings, it is worth stressing again that a court’s mere 
invocation of the transformative use concept does not appear to predetermine 
                                                                                                                 
 225 See infra app. A. 
 226 Although this study’s results show that the good faith/bad faith inquiry has a statistically sig-
nificant coefficient, the fact that this inquiry is so rarely applied means that this statistic is somewhat 
meaningless. 
 227 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 9, at 595 (displaying the empirical results of the subfactor analysis 
and showing that factor one’s subfactors have the most influence). 
 228 See id. at 621 (“In practice, judges appear to apply section 107 in the form of a cognitively 
more familiar two-sided balancing test in which they weigh the strength of the defendant’s justifica-
tion for its use, as that justification has been developed in the first three factors, against the impact of 
that use on the incentives of the plaintiff.”). 
 229 See supra tbl.8. 
 230 Beebe, supra note 9, at 595. 
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the transformative use or fair use outcomes. But these findings provide sub-
stantial evidence supporting the contention that however a court answers the 
transformative use inquiry is vitally important to how the court will decide fair 
use’s most important factors and the fair use outcome more generally. For liti-
gants, therefore, winning the transformative use fight is paramount. And as 
these data show, in modern courts that fight is nearly always present. 
c. Stampeding Revisited 
The transformative use doctrine’s hegemony in the overall fair use inquiry 
appears to be true despite a lack of “stampeding,” as Beebe calls it.231 In other 
words, this study’s data confirm that although a finding of transformative use 
appears to have a significant relationship to whether the use is ultimately fair 
(and on resolution of factors one, three, and four as well), a finding of trans-
formative use does not always dictate outcomes on these other factors. Hence, 
courts tend to call the factors as they see them, while still affording significant 
weight to transformative use in determining overall whether the use is fair. 
Be that as it may, another metric this study tracked is how often courts 
consider different factors and subfactors when resolving other factors within 
the broader fair use inquiry. For instance, although transformative use out-
comes may not strongly predict outcomes for factor two, how frequently do 
courts discuss transformative use within their factor two analyses? What about 
factors three and four? Overall, how often do courts discuss each of the factors 
and most important subfactors within their discussion and resolution of the 
others? 
We thought this metric was important to track for several reasons. First, 
inter-factor analysis is how the Supreme Court in Campbell instructed future 
courts to carry out their fair use discussions.232 Despite this, previous studies 
have not specifically tracked how often these inter-factor discussions occur. 
Second, occurrences of inter-factor analysis suggest stampeding by an-
other name. In fact, though courts may call the factors as they see them in 
terms of overall factor outcomes, courts often explicitly note in their discus-
sions of the various factors the influence of one or another “outside” factor.233 
For instance, courts often decide a particular factor is not fair, but note within 
that discussion that that determination does not matter much because other fac-
                                                                                                                 
 231 Id. at 588–89. 
 232 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79 (applying transformative use as a subfactor under factor 
one). 
 233 See, e.g., Kane v. Comedy Partners, 2003 WL 22383387, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003) (stat-
ing that because the use was transformative, if “factor [two] favors plaintiff, it is without much 
force”); Gaylord v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 59, 70 (2008) (implying that factor three’s weight in the 
overall analysis was less due to the transformative nature of the use). 
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tors outweigh it.234 This type of discounting occurs frequently in the context of 
factors two and three when courts deem the use transformative; courts concede 
that one or the other factor weighs against fair use, but then explicitly note that 
neither carries much weight overall because of the transformative nature of the 
use.235 Courts also sometimes determine a particular factor is fair, and as part 
of that determination, they indicate that some other fair use factor outside of 
the particular factor under discussion influenced that determination.236 
Finally, this metric is also important to track because it helps substantiate 
(or disaffirm) previous studies’ claims about the roles different factors play.237 
For instance, as discussed previously, Beebe in his earlier study claims that 
factor four is largely a place where courts synthesize their analyses of the pre-
vious three factors.238 This claim, if true, helps explain why factor four so 
strongly correlates with overall fair use outcomes—if factor four truly is where 
courts summarize their previous findings under the first three factors, then fac-
tor four should nearly always align with the overall fair use outcome. 
This study’s data provide some substantiation to these claims. For in-
stance, Table 11 below shows that in about fifty-eight percent of the opinions, 
the court discussed factor one considerations within the context of its factor 
four discussion. The table also shows that courts discussed factor three consid-
erations in a little over twenty-five percent of factor four discussions. Factor 
two considerations, unsurprisingly, came up in a little less than three percent of 
factor four discussions. In total, nearly sixty-five percent of the opinions in-
volved the court discussing factors one, two, or three considerations (or some 
combination thereof) in the context of their factor four discussions. Hence, this 
study’s data confirm that, more than any of the other factors, courts do in fact 
often use factor four as a space in which to discuss other factors in resolving 
factor four (and fair use) questions. 
                                                                                                                 
 234 See, e.g., Kane, 2003 WL 22383387, at *5 (affording little weight to factor two’s outcome in 
favor of the plaintiff because the defendant’s use was transformative); Gaylord, 85 Fed. Cl. at 69 
(explaining that “[a]lthough [plaintiff’s work] is creative, indicating that the second fair use factor 
weighs in favor of Plaintiff, this Court must give the second factor limited weight in the fair use anal-
ysis” because of “the transformative nature of [defendant’s work]”). 
 235 See, e.g., Kane, 2003 WL 22383387, at *5 (discounting the weight afforded to factor two due 
to the transformative nature of the use); Gaylord, 85 Fed. Cl. at 70 (strongly indicating under its anal-
ysis of factor three that, though disfavoring fair use, factor three’s weight in the overall analysis was 
less due to the transformative nature of the use). 
 236 See, e.g., Sofa Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 898, 906 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(deciding factor one favored the defendant in part because the amount of copying—seven seconds of a 
film—was limited, a concern that courts typically address under factor three). 
 237 See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 9, at 586 (stating that the first and fourth factors appear to have 
the most influence on the test, at least at a macro level); Netanel, supra note 10, at 743–44 (indicating 
that the fourth factor has recently experienced a decline relative to factor one’s importance). 
 238 Beebe, supra note 9, at 621. 
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What becomes equally clear when examining these data, however, is that 
courts also frequently engage in inter-factor analysis outside of factor four. 
Factors three and four, for instance, show up somewhat frequently in courts’ 
factor one discussions. In fact, courts discuss factor three considerations slight-
ly more frequently in the context of factor one than they do in the context of 
factor four (though factor four remains the most frequent venue for discussion 
of outside factors in general). Courts also discuss factor one considerations at a 
fair clip (about twenty-three percent of the time) in the context of factor two, 
though this study’s data show that factor two is not a typical place for courts to 
discuss factors three and four considerations. Overall, factor four remains the 
predominant area in which courts engage in inter-factor syntheses. But factors 
one and three, and to a lesser extent factor two, also sometimes prove to be 
fertile grounds for courts to discuss other fair use factors in resolving them. 
Importantly for this study’s purposes, the data also show that the trans-
formative use concept affects resolution of “non-native”239 fair use factors 
more frequently than any other tracked factor or subfactor (besides factor one’s 
composite score, much of which is driven by the transformative use concept). 
This means that the transformative use doctrine bleeds into analyses outside of 
its home base (factor one) more frequently than any other factor or subfactor. 
Astonishingly, this is true even when opinions that omit discussion of the 
transformative use concept altogether are included—transformative use re-
mains, by the percentages, the most frequent interloper in other factor discus-
sions. 
                                                                                                                 
 239 By this we mean factors and subfactors outside of factor one of the fair use test, where courts 
typically address the transformative use doctrine. 
Table 11. Frequency with Which Each Factor and Factor One Subfactors Affect 
Resolution of Other Fair Use Factors. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Factor 1  
(Total) 
100.00% 23.36% 55.56% 57.6% 
Transformative 
Use 
71.43% 16.78% 41.72% 37.87% 
Commercial 
Use 
90.23% 4.99% 17.23% 18.59% 
Preamble 55.33% 2.04% 3.85% 24.26% 
Parody 11.56% 4.99% 6.12% 6.35% 
Bad Faith 16.10% 0.00% 0.23% 0.00% 
Factor 2 4.76% 100.00% 3.63% 2.72% 
Factor 3 29.25% 3.4% 100.00% 25.17% 
Factor 4 17.91% 6.8% 12.24% 100.00% 
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And when only looking at opinions that utilize the transformative use 
doctrine, it is astonishing how frequently the transformative use doctrine ends 
up influencing factor discussions outside of factor one. For instance, about fif-
ty-three percent of this study’s transformative use opinions discussed the trans-
formative use concept within their factor four discussions, and close to sixty 
percent did so when discussing factor three. Furthermore, of the factors and 
subfactors studied, transformative use was the most frequent visitor to factor 
two discussions as well.240 Table 12 below lists the frequencies with which 
each of the fair use factors and factor one subfactors affected resolution of oth-
er fair use factors when considering only transformative use opinions. 
Notably, these data indicate that factor three may be more influential in 
how courts resolve the remaining fair use factors than factor four, which com-
mentators have traditionally viewed as one of the most important in the overall 
fair use calculus.241 Unsurprisingly, factor two appears to play a quite limited 
role in influencing resolution of the other fair use factors. As explored below, 
this result is not because factor two considerations are irrelevant, but rather 
                                                                                                                 
 240 It is important to note that when we say the opinions discussed the transformative use term 
within these other factor discussions, they often did so implicitly by, for instance, using the definition 
of transformative use within those discussions, or referring back to their transformative use discussion 
under factor one, even if they do not explicitly use the term again. 
 241 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[A][4] (stating that the fourth factor is the most 
salient factor in the fair use inquiry). This is largely based on the fact that the Supreme Court, at one 
time, explicitly said the fourth factor was the most important factor. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“This [fourth] factor is undoubtedly the single most 
important element of fair use.”). 
Table 12. Frequency with Which Each Factor and Factor One Subfactors Affect 
Resolution of Other Fair Use Factors, Transformative Use Opinions Only. 
Influencing 
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Factor 1  
(Total) 
100.00% 28.89% 69.21% 65.71% 
Transformative 
Use 
100.00% 23.49% 58.41% 53.02% 
Commercial 
Use 
90.16% 6.03% 21.90% 21.27% 
Preamble 60.95% 1.90% 4.44% 24.13% 
Parody 14.92% 6.67% 7.62% 7.62% 
Bad Faith 17.46% 0.00% 0.32% 0.00% 
Factor 2 5.08% 100.00% 3.49% 2.54% 
Factor 3 37.46% 3.17% 100.00% 29.84% 
Factor 4 19.68% 5.40% 14.29% 100.00% 
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because other factors within the fair use test already address those considera-
tions more effectively.242 
Hence, not only does transformative use appear to play a significant role 
in determining overall fair use outcomes, it is also the factor that shows up the 
most frequently (and by a significant margin) in how courts decide the other 
fair use factors. The presence of transformative use in these other factor dis-
cussions may not predetermine their outcome by “stampeding” results.243 But 
its frequent presence does suggest that the transformative use concept is help-
ing shape those discussions, and fair use outcomes generally, more than any 
other fair use factor. 
5. Are Certain Types of Uses More Likely to Be Found Transformative? 
This final Subsection considers yet another important transformative use 
question: what exactly does the term mean? While we may have a better sense 
of what sources courts rely on in defining the term and how often transforma-
tive users win their cases, the transformative use concept remains difficult to 
corral. Indeed, this difficulty is one of the primary complaints with the doc-
trine.244 
In his earlier study, Sag attempted to better predict fair use outcomes by 
assessing the characteristics of uses that would have been known to litigants 
pretrial.245 A large part of his study thus focuses on identifying particular types 
of uses that are more likely to be found fair.246 He uses “creativity shift” as a 
proxy for transformative use, which he defines as when a defendant uses the 
plaintiff’s creative copyrighted work for an informational purpose, or vice ver-
sa (i.e., the defendant uses the plaintiff’s informational work for a creative 
purpose).247 He finds that when defendants use copyrighted works for such 
fundamentally different purposes, courts tend to find that those uses are fair.248 
In his study, Sag thus relies on one prevalent meaning of transformative 
use—a shift in purpose.249 This study, however, goes beyond this finding and 
assesses other characteristics of uses that may be relevant to transformative use 
                                                                                                                 
 242 See infra notes 319–335 and accompanying text. 
 243 Beebe, supra note 9, at 588–93. 
 244 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[A][1][b] (discussing the difficulty in ascertain-
ing the meaning of what constitutes transformative use). 
 245 Sag, supra note 15, at 47, 49. 
 246 Id. at 74–75. 
 247 Id. at 58. 
 248 Id. at 74. 
 249 Id. at 58. It should be noted that Sag was fully aware that “creative shift” is only a partial 
proxy for transformative use. See id. at 76 (“The positive and significant coefficient associated with 
[the creative shift variable] shows that . . . this proxy measure for transformative use makes a finding 
of fair use more likely.”). 
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and fair use questions. We thus gathered a number of additional data in hopes 
of better understanding what courts mean when they use the transformative use 
term. These include data about whether the use involved altering the original 
work with new expression, using the work in a new context, and a shift in me-
dium between the original work and the purported fair use. 
First, what role, if any, does altering the original work with new expres-
sion play? Some have argued that courts should limit the transformative use 
doctrine to situations where the defendant actually alters the original work.250 
For instance, if a party uses a copyrighted photo as part of a montage but oth-
erwise leaves the photo intact, some believe such uses should be ineligible for 
a transformative use finding because the purported fair user did nothing to alter 
the original work itself.251 Yet courts routinely note that merely altering a cop-
yrighted work with new expression does not necessarily make a use transform-
ative.252 A sequel to a movie is a clear example of altering the original copy-
righted work with new expression that would not automatically qualify as a 
transformative use.253 Instead, such a use would typically qualify as making a 
derivative work, one of the core rights of copyright holders.254 
This study thus investigates what role altering the original work with new 
creative expression plays. Do courts frequently find unaltered uses of works to 
be transformative and fair? And does altering an original work with new crea-
tive expression even help a party’s transformative use and fair use chances? 
The data provide some insights to these questions. Of the 315 transforma-
tive use opinions, eighty-six involved uses where the defendant altered the 
                                                                                                                 
 250 TCA Television Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 180 (2d Cir. 2016) (“In sum, even if, as 
the district court concluded, [the work in contention] is a ‘darkly comedic critique of the social norms 
governing a small town in the Bible Belt,’ and even if the Play’s purpose and character are completely 
different from the [original] . . . that, by itself, does not demonstrate that defendants’ use . . . was 
transformative of the original work.”) (citation omitted); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, 
§ 13.05[B][6] (“Although defendant’s usage was funny, the humor was an achievement belonging to 
the original copyright owners, not to defendants who took advantage of it without transforming it. . . . 
[TCA Television Corp.] thus supplies a necessary course correction[.]”). 
 251 See TCA Television, 839 F.3d at 180 (explaining that even if the defendants’ purpose was 
distinct from the original’s purpose, it does not inherently make the use transformative); NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[B][6] (praising the court’s refusal in TCA Television Corp. to find a 
transformative use because the defendants “took advantage of [the original] without transforming it”). 
 252 See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A secondary work may modify 
the original without being transformative.”); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 
F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Although derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright 
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, such works . . . take expression for pur-
poses that are not ‘transformative.’”). 
 253 See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 267–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated on other 
grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding a sequel to Catcher in the Rye to be a derivative work of 
the same). 
 254 See id. (finding the sequel to not be transformative and, instead, an infringing derivative 
work). 
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original work with new creative expression. To be clear, this category only in-
cludes uses where the party actually made alterations to the original work; it 
does not count uses that left the copyrighted work unaltered, even if the use 
occurred in a different context or in conjunction with new creative expression. 
Of these eighty-six opinions, fifty-six found the use to be transformative (six-
ty-five percent), and forty-six of these fifty-six found the use fair (eighty-two 
percent). Thus, though altering the original work with new expression may not 
be necessary to a finding of transformative use and fair use, it often seems to 
be sufficient. 
Of the 229 transformative use opinions where the defendant failed to alter 
the original work with new creative expression, ninety-six of these (forty-two 
percent) still found the use to be transformative, and ninety-two of those nine-
ty-six opinions found the overall outcome to be fair (nearly ninety-six percent). 
Hence, while altering the original with new expression may in some cases aid 
defendants in their fair use quests, many defendants who fail to alter the origi-
nal work with new expression still come out on top. 
Using copyrighted works in new contexts is another piece of data we col-
lected in hopes of better understanding what courts mean by the transformative 
use term. We defined uses involving a new context broadly, covering any use 
that went beyond mere replication of the copyrighted work in the same medi-
um or for the same purpose. For example, posting a news article online verba-
tim for purposes of discussion would qualify as a use in a new context, as 
would altering the Mona Lisa by adding a mustache and beard to the painting. 
We defined this category broadly to assess how much of a difference a 
mere change in venue makes. Based solely on anecdotal statements in the fair 
use case law, it is difficult to tell. For instance, courts frequently stress the new 
context in which the defendant placed the copyrighted work in finding uses to 
be transformative and fair.255 In an important Second Circuit case, the court 
relied on just such reasoning in finding that a party’s use of unaltered artwork 
in a historical book about the Grateful Dead was transformative and, accord-
ingly, a fair use.256 Yet courts also routinely conclude that a mere change in 
medium, on its own, is insufficient to guarantee a favorable fair use out-
come.257 So which is it? Or, perhaps, is it both? 
                                                                                                                 
 255 See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1165 (finding Google’s use of thumbnail 
images as part of its search engine transformative in part because the use involved using the images in 
a new context); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006) (indi-
cating that uses are transformative when defendants use plaintiffs’ copyrighted works “in a different 
context such that the plaintiff’s work is transformed into a new creation”). 
 256 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 606–07, 611 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 257 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 135, 143 (holding the use was not transformative 
despite the change in medium of famous lines and scenes from Seinfeld put into text in a trivia book); 
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The data suggest that a mere change in context, on its own, does not an-
swer the transformative use question decisively. Of the 315 transformative use 
opinions, 274 included using the copyrighted work in a new context (eighty-
seven percent). Of these, 148 found the use to be transformative, while 124 did 
not.258 Based on these percentages alone, it seems that using a copyrighted 
work in a new context may provide a slight transformative use edge, though 
the substantial number of transformative use losers in this category suggests 
that that edge is just that: slight, if at all. 
On the other hand, the forty-one transformative use opinions that did not 
involve use in a new context almost all resulted in the court finding the use to 
be non-transformative (ninety percent). And of these thirty-seven opinions, 
only two ultimately found the use to be fair (about five percent). Hence, while 
changing contexts may not ensure a favorable transformative use and fair use 
finding, failing to use a copyrighted work in a new context does appear to put 
defendants at a significant transformative use and fair use disadvantage. 
What about parties that both alter the original with new expression and 
use the original work in a new context? Based on this study’s data, a party’s 
transformative use odds only went up slightly when combining these two met-
rics rather than solely looking to whether the party altered the original with 
new creative expression (seventy percent transformative use win rate versus a 
sixty-five percent transformative use win rate). Furthermore, the overall fair 
use win rates for both groups were identical. 
Another metric this study tracked is the medium in which the original 
work appeared and whether that medium changed with the alleged fair use. For 
instance, in many cases parties copied copyrighted music into a film, or parties 
took traditional print media (such as books), digitized that media, and made it 
available online. Tracking this metric helps assess whether courts are more 
likely to consider uses of some media transformative and determine whether a 
change in medium relates to the transformative use inquiry. One might expect 
it to do so because “transforming” copyrighted materials might reasonably in-
clude situations in which the copyrighted material goes from one medium to 
the other. Note that shifts in medium are a subset of our earlier category of us-
es in a new context. 
The medium categories used in coding the opinions are similar to those 
used by Beebe: non-virtual, two-dimensional textual material (such as books); 
non-virtual, two-dimensional images, graphics, illustrations, and other artwork 
(such as photographs); technological media, including software and Internet 
                                                                                                                 
Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the unaltered re-
transmission of a radio broadcast through a different medium was not a transformative use). 
 258 Two of the 315 cases did not definitively determine whether the use was transformative. 
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technology; videos (including traditional television, film, and movies); music; 
performances; and three-dimensional artwork (such as sculptures).259 Note that 
in some cases, the original copyrighted work overlapped several mediums. 
Similar to Beebe’s study, the most frequent original medium for copy-
righted works in this study’s opinions was non-virtual, two-dimensional textual 
material (a little over thirty-two percent), followed by non-virtual, two-
dimensional imagery (nearly twenty-four percent).260 Thus, non-virtual texts 
and imagery combined accounted for a little over fifty-five percent of the cop-
yrighted works at the center of our opinions’ fair use fights. 
As one might expect, technological mediums accounted for a higher per-
centage of uses than in previous studies. Although only about twenty percent 
of the study’s opinions concerned works that were originally embodied in a 
technological medium, nearly forty-two percent of these opinions concerned 
technological uses of the copyrighted works, including digitizing and making 
available online a variety of traditional print media. In total, about forty-seven 
percent of the opinions implicated technological mediums, a dramatic increase 
from Beebe’s earlier study.261 Furthermore, from 2006 to 2017, this trend ac-
celerated significantly, with a little over fifty-seven percent of the opinions 
implicating technological uses of copyrighted works. 
Scholars in the past have called for some form of “technological fair use” 
in order to make fair use more responsive to technological advances.262 Does 
the transformative use paradigm already help update fair use by incorporating 
technological considerations within its ambit? This study’s summary figures do 
not clearly answer this question. Of the 315 opinions in this study that utilized 
the transformative use concept, 149 (forty-seven percent) implicated techno-
logical uses of the copyrighted material. This percentage does not clarify much 
about how courts may or may not be utilizing the transformative use concept to 
address technological changes; it merely tells us that in nearly half of all trans-
formative use opinions, courts end up having to apply the transformative use 
paradigm to facts implicating technological uses of the copyrighted work. Out-
side of transformative use, as mentioned above, nearly half (and over half 
more recently) of this study’s opinions implicated technological mediums. This 
means that, in general, courts frequently must apply fair use to technological 
                                                                                                                 
 259 See Beebe, supra note 9, at 572–73 (categorizing court opinions based upon the various medi-
ums the courts considered). 
 260 See id. 
 261 See id. at 573 (finding that only about twenty-two percent of opinions between the years 1988 
and 2005 involved technology). 
 262 Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 801, 804 (2010); see also Clark 
D. Asay, Intellectual Property Law Hybridization, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 65, 105–06 (2016) (proposing 
another form of technological fair use that explicitly takes into account patent law considerations). 
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mediums, with and without the transformative use concept in tow. While a 
more technologically focused fair use doctrine may still make sense, it seems 
clear from this study’s data that courts are having plenty of practice applying 
fair use (and transformative use) in technological contexts. 
At a very basic level, courts do not appear to favor technological uses of 
copyrighted works when deciding whether the use is transformative. For in-
stance, only about forty-three percent of the transformative use opinions that 
involved technological uses of copyrighted works resulted in a finding of 
transformative use. Of these transformative uses, about ninety-four percent 
ultimately found the use to be fair. In contrast, of the 166 opinions in which the 
copyrighted work was neither originally in a technological medium nor later 
used in one, courts found fifty-three percent of these to be transformative and 
about eighty-nine percent of these transformative uses to be fair use overall. 
Hence, because a finding of transformative use is so strongly associated with a 
finding of fair use overall, it actually appears that non-technological uses may 
have the upper hand, at least percentage-wise, in terms of being deemed fair. 
Of the 315 transformative use opinions in this study, 148 included a shift 
in medium (e.g., from print to video), while 167 did not. About fifty-two per-
cent of these no-medium-shift opinions found the use to be transformative, 
while only about forty-five percent of the opinions where a medium shift did 
occur found the use to be transformative. Thus, at least based on these sum-
mary figures, a shift from one medium to another does not appear to result in a 
higher likelihood that the court will find the use to be transformative. In fact, 
some of our regression results presented in Appendix A suggest a negative re-
lationship; if anything, medium shifts may predict a greater likelihood of a 
non-transformative use finding. 
Overall, it remains difficult to say what types of alterations or new uses 
courts are likely to deem transformative. Altering copyrighted works with new 
expression appears to be associated with an improvement in a party’s fair use 
chances, though doing so does not appear essential. Using a work in a new 
context seems nearly necessary but insufficient for a finding of transformative 
use. Medium shifts and technological uses also fall far short of guaranteeing a 
transformative use victory—in fact, they may push in the opposite direction. 
And the regression analysis performed using these factors as independent vari-
ables on transformative use outcomes confirms this messy state of affairs. Alt-
hough some of these factors exhibit statistically significant relationships to 
transformative use outcomes, the regression models suffered from a significant 
amount of statistical unreliability.263 Hence, though the transformative use doc-
                                                                                                                 
 263 See infra app. A. 
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trine is increasingly crucial to the fair use doctrine more generally, it remains 
an elusive concept to pin down. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
A. Has Transformative Use Gone Too Far? 
One question worth revisiting in light of this Article’s findings is whether 
courts have taken the transformative use concept too far, as some have sug-
gested.264 In other words, if transformative use is eating the world, is that a bad 
thing? 
Fair use, after all, is meant to be a flexible standard that courts adapt to 
whatever the circumstances merit, all in an effort to bring about the most just 
results.265 Neither the doctrine’s codification in 1976 nor any particular fair use 
decision was meant to stymie that flexibility and the doctrine’s ongoing evolu-
tion.266 But if transformative use is dominating the overall fair use analysis, as 
this Article suggests is happening to a greater degree than previously believed, 
that reality could be preventing flexible application of fair use in ways that 
would otherwise yield net social benefits. 
Consider, for instance, application of the fair use doctrine in the software 
context. Software is functional in nature; the reuse of software typically impli-
                                                                                                                 
 264 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We’re skeptical of 
Cariou’s approach [that placed emphasis on transformativeness], because asking exclusively whether 
something is ‘transformative’ not only replaces the list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(2), which protects derivative works.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.05[A][1][b] 
(“Many of the [opinions utilizing the doctrine] are conclusory—they appear to label a use ‘not trans-
formative’ as a shorthand for ‘not fair,’ and correlatively ‘transformative’ for ‘fair.’ Such a strategy 
empties the term of meaning.”); Adler, supra note 36, at 563 (“[T]he move to the transformative anal-
ysis, thought by many to be the solution to fair use woes, has actually made things worse for the visual 
arts.”); Pitino, supra note 14, at 26 (“[T]he predominately accepted transformative use test heavily 
favors secondary users at the expense of copyright holders.”). 
 265 See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he fair 
use inquiry is a flexible one. The four statutory factors provide courts with tools to determine—
through a weighing of the four factors in light of the facts of a given case—whether a finding of fair 
use is warranted in that particular instance.”); Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-
Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“The case-by-case analysis resists bright-
line determinations and the resulting decisions inevitably represent a sort of rough justice.”). 
 266 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“Congress meant § 107 
‘to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way’ and 
intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.”); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“The [Section 107] drafters resisted 
pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the 
provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”); H.R. REP. NO. 83, at 32 
(1967) (“Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria appli-
cable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case ba-
sis.”). 
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cates the very same computing functions that the original software was de-
signed to perform.267 Under some interpretations of the transformative use 
concept, reuse of software is, consequently, almost never transformative be-
cause those reuses are for the “same intrinsic purpose” as the original soft-
ware—to perform the only computing function of which the software is capa-
ble.268 In fact, in a recent high-profile copyright infringement suit between Or-
acle and Google, Oracle made this precise point in arguing that Google’s reuse 
of some of its software was not transformative because Google used that soft-
ware to perform the same computing functions for which the software was de-
signed.269 
But accepting such an argument would mean that third parties can almost 
never rely on the fair use defense in the software context.270 This is because, as 
we have previously seen, if a party loses the transformative use argument, they 
are likely to lose the overall fair use question as well, particularly in the mod-
ern era.271 Hence, to the extent that transformative use has come to stifle flexi-
ble application of the fair use doctrine in key contexts such as software, that 
reality may end up, ironically, stifling the very creativity that the doctrine is 
meant to help facilitate. This may be particularly so because fair use has be-
come an important part of enabling innovative reuses of software.272 
Amy Adler has highlighted the modern visual arts world as another con-
text where the dominance of the transformative use inquiry may have negative 
repercussions.273 In that world, modern visual artists often copy the entirety of 
works of others, in part as a rejection of the concept of “newness” or any real 
stability in artistic meaning.274 The famous appropriation artist Richard Prince 
is the quintessential example of this type of artist—some of his recent artwork, 
                                                                                                                 
 267 Asay, supra note 13, at 14. 
 268 See, e.g., Opening Brief & Addendum for Oracle America, Inc. at 29–37, Oracle Am., Inc. v. 
Google Inc., (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2017) (Nos. 17-1118, 17-1202), 2017 WL 679347 (arguing that the 
use was not transformative because there was no alteration or change in expression from the original) 
(emphasis in original removed). 
 269 Id. The Supreme Court recently agreed to review that argument. Adi Robertson, The Supreme 
Court Will Hear Google and Oracle’s Nearly Decade-Long Copyright Fight, THE VERGE (Nov. 15, 
2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/15/20946398/oracle-google-java-copyright-lawsuit-trial-
supreme-court-request [https://perma.cc/7JH3-FA2K]. 
 270 See Asay, supra note 13, at 14 (explaining that Oracle’s argument, if wholly accepted, would 
mean software reuse can rarely—if ever—be transformative due to software’s functional nature). 
 271 Netanel, supra note 10, at 717 (“The erratic nature of U.S. fair use is frequently raised in op-
position to legislative proposals to adopt a fair use defense to give courts a more flexible tool to ac-
commodate new technological uses that fall outside narrow statutory exceptions.”). 
 272 Pamela Samuelson & Clark D. Asay, Saving Software’s Fair Use Future, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 535, 537 (2018) (“Fair use in the digital age has come to play an important role in balancing 
the interests of first- and second-generation creators in software as well as other creative fields.”). 
 273 Adler, supra note 36, at 563. 
 274 Id. 
2020] Is Transformative Use Eating the World? 957 
for example, involves copying others’ Instagram posts verbatim in their entire-
ty and simply increasing the posts’ scale.275 His only other alteration is to in-
clude emoji-filled and often crude comments beneath the actual Instagram 
post.276 Prince (and other similar artists) may have a claim to transformative-
ness in such cases; after all, he does include some commentary to otherwise 
identical artwork.277 And perhaps appropriation is the message itself.278 But 
courts have often found that simply adding some material to otherwise unal-
tered copies of works does not make a use transformative.279 Indeed, the mod-
ern transformative use inquiry focuses on the second comer’s added expression 
or meaning in using the copyrighted material, the “very criteria that contempo-
rary art rejects” in the act of appropriation.280 Hence, to the extent modern 
courts rely on typical understandings of the transformative use concept, mod-
ern visual artists face significant, and perhaps insurmountable, hurdles in win-
ning fair use cases.281 
Of course, one solution to such issues is for courts to take the Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. Court at its word. As that Court explained, uses need 
not be transformative to be fair.282 Courts thus have leeway to emphasize other 
factors in the software, modern art, and other contexts so that fair use defenses 
can succeed in them. There are some examples where courts rely on such flex-
ibility in rendering fair use decisions.283 But it takes a confident, brave court to 
do so. Indeed, taking the Campbell Court at its word also means acknowledg-
ing the importance of the transformative use concept in the vast majority of 
cases, because according to the Court, transformative uses are precisely the 
type of uses most likely to help achieve copyright law’s goals.284 And as the 
                                                                                                                 
 275 Hannah Jane Parkinson, Instagram, an Artist and the $100,000 Selfies—Appropriation in the 
Digital Age, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/18/
instagram-artist-richard-prince-selfies [https://perma.cc/527X-32JZ]. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id.; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (explaining that transformative use “adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage”). 
 278 Parkinson, supra note 275. 
 279 See, e.g., L.A. Time v. Free Republic, 1999 WL 33644483, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999) 
(“Adding commentary to a verbatim copy of a copyrighted work or portions thereof does not trans-
form the work.”). 
 280 Adler, supra note 36, at 563. 
 281 See id. at 562–64 (arguing that the transformative use paradigm does not work well in the 
contemporary art context because of contemporary art’s norms). 
 282 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 283 See, e.g., Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (arguing against focusing on transformative use in fair use 
analyses); Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2000) (be-
ginning its fair use analysis with the second factor, therewith implicitly signaling that factor’s greater 
importance in software reuse cases). 
 284 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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data show, increasingly more courts have followed this admonition in render-
ing their fair use decisions.285 Thus, to the extent that courts mechanically ap-
ply the transformative use concept in contexts where it may not make sense to 
do so, the transformative use concept may end up stymieing the very creativity 
it is meant to enable. 
On the other side of the ledger, of course, is the argument that courts’ 
widespread adoption of the transformative use concept has actually facilitated 
a significant amount of socially beneficial creativity.286 In fact, the concept’s 
application in a variety of new contexts is precisely the basis for some parties’ 
complaints that courts have taken the transformative use concept too far.287 
Hence, though instances may arise where an undue focus on the transformative 
use concept may prevent uses that would otherwise provide overall social ben-
efits, by and large emphasizing transformative uses may still prove to be fair 
use’s best bet. 
For instance, today we take Internet search engines for granted. But their 
ongoing survival depends in large part on courts’ earlier findings that their use 
and display of copyrighted materials was a fair use.288 These fair use determi-
nations, furthermore, depended in large part on the courts’ flexible application 
of the transformative use concept in a new technological environment.289 
Since that time, courts have continued to apply the transformative use 
concept flexibly in enabling innovative technological uses of copyrighted ma-
terials.290 The Second Circuit, for instance, only recently found Google’s copy-
ing of tens of millions of books into its Google Books service to be trans-
                                                                                                                 
 285 See supra tbls.1–3. 
 286 The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the 
Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 8 (2014) (statement of Professor Peter Jaszi, 
Washington College of Law, American University) (stating that the transformative use doctrine has 
helped the courts adequately implement the fair use statute); see Netanel, supra note 10, at 771 (point-
ing to greater consistency in fair use case law since the transformative use concept’s ascendancy). 
 287 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 36, at 563 (critiquing the transformative use’s application to con-
temporary art); Where We Stand, Authors Guild v. Google, AUTHORS GUILD, https://www.authors
guild.org/where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/ [https://perma.cc/J4JN-VLCX] (critiquing the “ex-
pansion of fair use” in light of the Second Circuit’s ruling that Google’s copying of millions of books 
verbatim into its Google Books project was transformative because of its significant public service). 
 288 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
Google’s display of thumbnail versions of images located on third-party sites in response to user 
searches constituted fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding search engine’s display of copyrighted images in response to user queries was fair use). 
 289 See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1163 (“We must be flexible in applying a fair use 
analysis.”); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818 (“We must balance these [fair use] factors in light of the objectives 
of copyright law, rather than view them as definitive or determinative tests.”). 
 290 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207, 213, 229 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating 
that Congress intended the fair use statute to be flexible, and finding the use of Google Books trans-
formative and, ultimately, fair); Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(concluding that the digitization of various copyrighted works was transformative and fair use). 
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formative and overall a fair use.291 The use was transformative because the 
Google Books service allowed for uses of the works that the original author 
had not envisioned, including data mining and digital searching.292 The Second 
Circuit came to this conclusion despite the reality that authors lost out on a 
large sum of money for those digital copies—in fact, the parties had negotiated 
several iterations of a settlement agreement over nearly a decade that would 
have paid authors a significant amount of money for Google’s use of the 
works.293 But courts rejected those settlement attempts for a variety of reasons, 
and ultimately the Second Circuit found that Google’s use was transformative 
and fair.294 
Indeed, modern courts’ focus on the transformative use concept may be a 
positive development overall, despite whatever problems that emphasis entails, 
primarily because it means the fourth factor receives less deference in how 
courts apply fair use. More colloquially, transformative use’s ascendance and 
the fourth factor’s demise may be a classic example of addition by subtraction. 
The transformative use concept itself may not be the perfect vehicle for ensur-
ing that fair use helps copyright achieve its intended purposes. But it is certain-
ly a better vehicle than the fourth factor such that deemphasizing the fourth 
factor yields positive results in its own right. 
The fourth factor, after all, has been notoriously difficult to apply.295 In 
fact, as mentioned earlier, courts often simply use it as a space to summarize 
their analyses of the preceding three factors; in most cases, courts make few 
actual factor four findings.296 Making findings under the fourth factor can be 
difficult in part because of an oft-noted circularity problem.297 This problem 
lies in the reality that any uncompensated use can be said to harm the work’s 
market because the copyright holder loses out on a fee for that use.298 And 
while many courts acknowledge that this type of reasoning should not dictate 
resolution of the fourth factor, it is difficult to say what else should.299 Courts 
                                                                                                                 
 291 Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d at 207, 229. 
 292 Id. at 209, 216, 229. 
 293 Where We Stand, supra note 287. 
 294 Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d at 229; see Where We Stand, supra note 287 (summarizing 
the various hurdles to the settlement agreement including various opposition and court rejections). 
 295 See Beebe, supra note 9, at 620–21 (“Ultimately, the paradox of the fourth factor is that it is 
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 297 Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 185, 190–91 (2007); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use 
in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38–41 (1997). 
 298 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 928–30 (2d Cir. 1994) (dis-
cussing the pitfalls of this type of circular reasoning under the fourth factor). 
 299 See, e.g., id. at 931 (pointing out the “vice of circular reasoning” under the fourth factor); 
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347, 1357–59 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (rejecting 
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sometimes import a presumption based on the first factor—if the court consid-
ers the use to be commercial under the first factor, then the court presumes 
market harm unless the defendant rebuts that presumption.300 But that pre-
sumption suffers from circular reasoning itself, particularly because, as courts 
have noted, “no man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.”301 Or un-
der the fourth factor, courts sometimes look to whether the uncompensated 
uses concern traditional or likely to be developed markets for the copyrighted 
works.302 But that inquiry also suffers from a circularity problem, because 
copyright owners would seem to be able to guarantee victories under the fourth 
factor simply by demanding license fees for any use of their work.303 In fact, 
only recently a court engaged in this type of circular reasoning in resolving a 
high-profile fair use case against the defendants.304 
Hence, given the difficulty courts face in applying the fourth factor, dis-
placing its earlier predominance in fair use doctrine with the transformative 
use concept is arguably a positive development. This is not to say that the 
transformative use concept does not suffer from its own set of issues, some of 
which have been noted above.305 But its deficiencies appear to be less dire than 
those that have long afflicted the fourth factor. 
Furthermore, addressing the transformative use concept’s deficiencies, 
though not an easy fix, is certainly within courts’ discretion. As discussed 
above, the Campbell Court made clear that a finding of transformative use, 
while important, is not necessary for a finding of fair use.306 Thus, courts are 
explicitly permitted to emphasize other factors where the context warrants. 
In the software context, the functional nature of software would seem to 
warrant a greater focus on factor two considerations in the overall fair use 
                                                                                                                 
plaintiff’s argument that it will suffer market harm from defendant’s photocopying of its articles be-
cause such photocopying will take away subscribers who would otherwise pay for a subscription to 
plaintiff’s periodicals). 
 300 See, e.g., Shell v. City of Radford, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (W.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Ass’n 
of Am. Med. Colls. v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1991)) (“If the intended use is for commer-
cial gain, that likelihood [of market harm] may be presumed.”). 
 301 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584). 
 302 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 96; Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 928–29. 
 303 Cf. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 882, 884 (2007) (noting that risk-averse users often seek licenses for uses of intellectual property 
that the law may not actually require). 
 304 Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding that 
the fourth factor favored plaintiffs because they had already developed a market with respect to de-
fendant’s use of their copyrighted works). 
 305 See Adler, supra note 36, at 563 (stating that the transformative use doctrine does not ade-
quately serve the nuances of contemporary art); Pitino, supra note 14, at 26 (arguing that the trans-
formative use doctrine has unjustly displaced the other important fair use factors). 
 306 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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equation.307 As discussed earlier, this factor typically carries little weight in fair 
use analyses.308 But the functional nature of software has traditionally meant 
that it enjoys a narrower scope of copyright in general, and emphasizing factor 
two considerations would allow courts to more effectively implement that tenet 
of copyright law in software fair use cases.309 Greater attention to factor two in 
software reuse cases would not necessarily always weigh in favor of fair use; 
one can imagine situations where a second comer copies the more expressive 
components of a software program for reasons unrelated to functionality, 
which copying would generally weigh against a finding of fair use under factor 
two. But in situations where a follow-on user copies functionally dictated ele-
ments of a software program, emphasizing that reality under factor two would 
allow courts to do greater fair use justice in software fair use cases. 
In the modern arts context, as Adler argues, redirecting attention away 
from transformative use to other factors may also be warranted.310 For in-
stance, given the norms of contemporary art,311 focusing on whether the ap-
propriation art functions as a market substitute for the original under factor 
four, rather than attempting to decipher new meaning in the use as part of the 
transformative use inquiry, may be a better approach in deciding contemporary 
art fair use cases. 
Alternatively, courts may continue to emphasize the transformative use 
inquiry but simply apply it flexibly rather than mechanically. The transforma-
tive use standard that the Campbell Court articulated, after all, is not a defini-
tion.312 Instead, it is a broad standard that seems capable of encompassing all 
sorts of uses, so long as those uses do not “merely supersede[] the objects of the 
original creation . . . [but] instead add[] something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.”313 Adler notes that courts have developed several different approaches 
to applying this definition, none of which work well in the contemporary art 
context.314 But it need not be so. By recognizing the norms and practices of 
                                                                                                                 
 307 See Asay, supra note 13, at 15 (“Software’s functional nature situates software farther from 
the core of intended copyright protection than other types of works.”). 
 308 See Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 572 (2008) (discuss-
ing the typical irrelevance of factor two in fair use decisions); supra tbl.10 (showing factor two’s 
limited impact). 
 309 Samuelson & Asay, supra note 272, at 561. 
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the transformative inquiry asks precisely the wrong questions about contemporary art.”). 
 311 Id. at 562–63. 
 312 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (providing a general list of aspects a transformative work may 
embody such as new purpose or message). 
 313 Id. (internal quotations removed). 
 314 Adler, supra note 36, at 584. 
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contemporary art, courts could almost certainly find room for contemporary art 
fair uses within the Campbell Court’s broad transformative use standard. 
In fact, courts have already flexibly applied the transformative use con-
cept in other contexts, particularly technological ones.315 It thus remains cru-
cial that courts not become too wedded to particular applications or under-
standings of the transformative use standard itself. Of course, the United 
States’ precedential tradition makes it tempting for courts to confine the trans-
formative use inquiry to the dustbin of whatever historical uses courts have 
previously considered to be transformative. Indeed, because Campbell en-
dorsed the transformative use concept in the context of a parody, courts at-
tempting to apply the transformative use concept may have difficulty applying 
it with confidence outside of the parodic context.316 Yet that is precisely what 
courts must do for the transformative use concept to continue to serve its in-
tended purpose within the overall fair use doctrine.317 
In sum, although transformative use may be eating the world of fair use, 
that trend is arguably better than courts relying on the fourth factor and its 
commerciality compatriot from factor one. Furthermore, there are ways for 
courts to mitigate whatever ills a focus on transformative use entails. First, Su-
preme Court precedent provides courts with leeway to emphasize other factors 
within the fair use inquiry when the context warrants it.318 Second, courts 
should continue to flexibly apply the transformative use standard rather than 
reducing that standard to a more limited definition that was never intended. 
B. Reforming Fair Use 
Another implication from this study’s findings is that simplifying the fair 
use doctrine by eliminating several of its factors may be warranted. In particu-
lar, eliminating factors two and four from the analysis may help streamline the 
doctrine without affecting fair use’s overall effectiveness. In fact, doing so may 
help courts to apply the fair use doctrine more effectively. 
For instance, this study’s data suggest that factor two, the nature of the 
work, seems to play only a modest role in the fair use inquiry. Factor two out-
                                                                                                                 
 315 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d at 207, 214, 229 (stating that “[t]he word ‘trans-
formative’ cannot be taken too literally” and finding the use of Google Books transformative); Ha-
thiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97, 101 (concluding that the digitization of various copyrighted works was trans-
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comes do not predict overall fair use outcomes, nor does factor two appear to 
explicitly affect resolution of the other factors much at all.319 In fact, factor two 
explicitly affected resolution of other fair use factors less than any other factor 
or subfactor examined.320 Other studies have similarly found that factor two 
outcomes failed to strongly correlate with overall fair use outcomes, thus sug-
gesting a lack of effect.321 However, when testing the significance of factor 
two’s dominant subfactors—whether the work is more creative than factual 
and the work’s publication status—Beebe found that these subfactors seemed 
to significantly affect fair use outcomes.322 This finding suggests factor two’s 
concerns are not irrelevant in how courts assess fair use, which stands in some 
contrast to others’ claims that factor two is inconsequential and thus should be 
abolished.323 This Article also proposes eliminating factor two, but not because 
factor two is irrelevant. Instead, this Article suggests that factor two’s concerns 
are better (and already are) addressed in other parts of the fair use inquiry. 
As we assessed how frequently each of the factors affects resolutions of 
the others, for instance, it became apparent that courts often address the con-
cerns factor two is meant to safeguard under other fair use factors.324 And ar-
guably, these other fair use factors address the second factor’s concerns more 
effectively than factor two itself. This may help explain Beebe’s counterintui-
tive finding that factor two seems irrelevant overall, even though its primary 
subfactors do not.325 Consequently, eliminating factor two would simplify the 
fair use analysis without undermining—and perhaps better serving—factor 
two’s purported role. 
To illustrate: factor two largely focuses on ensuring that creative expres-
sion receives a narrower scope of fair use, while factual and functional works 
receive a broader scope.326 Yet factor three already asks courts to assess the 
amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work that the second comer has 
taken.327 In fact, in applying the third factor, courts often consider whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 319 See supra tbls.10–12 and infra app. A (showing factor two’s limited impact). 
 320 See supra tbls.11–12 and infra app. A. 
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second comer has copied qualitatively important expression versus simply el-
ements of the copyrighted work undeserving of much protection (such as facts 
or other non-expressive portions of the work).328 The “heart” of a work, in-
deed, is often the most expressive, creative portions of the work.329 Hence, fac-
tor three’s application typically already addresses the most important concerns 
factor two is meant to address: whether the user has taken highly creative por-
tions of the work. This may be why factor two typically does not end up mat-
tering much—because factor three already effectively addresses factor two’s 
primary concerns. 
At times factor one’s transformative use subfactor also ends up helping 
address the concerns that factor two is meant to protect. For instance, in some 
cases courts focus as part of that inquiry on whether the defendants used the 
copyrighted material for its original expressive purposes or, instead, for a 
transformative purpose that primarily relied on the factual or informational 
components of the copyrighted work.330 Indeed, when defendants repurpose 
copyrighted materials for news reporting, comment, criticism, and other fa-
vored uses, courts often take into account as part of the transformativeness in-
quiry factor two’s concern of protecting the underlying expression while al-
lowing for informational uses of the content.331 Factor one is thus also some-
times a space where courts get at the real concerns underlying factor two. 
Furthermore, factor two’s presence in the fair use analysis may do more 
harm than good because it asks courts to assess the nature of the work as a 
whole, rather than the nature of the portion of the copyrighted work that the 
second comer has actually taken (which, again, the first and third factors often 
end up addressing).332 The possible harm of factor two’s focus is to distract 
courts from the more relevant inquiry concerning what the second comer actu-
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ally took and how they used it.333 Of course, given the second factor’s near 
statistical irrelevance, at least at a macro-level,334 it seems this distraction rare-
ly leads courts down many rabbit holes. But factor two’s presence nonetheless 
leads courts to clutter their fair use analyses with mostly irrelevant tidbits relat-
ing to the nature of the work overall, rather than the creativity relating to the 
portion of the work the second comer actually used. Given factors one and 
three’s focus on this latter issue, judicial economy would be well served with 
factor two’s removal. 
This proposal, furthermore, is consistent with the admonition above that 
courts should give more weight to factor two in the software context due to 
software’s functional nature.335 Because courts can and often do already ad-
dress the primary concerns factor two is meant to tackle under factors one and 
three (and arguably, more effectively), courts could simply stress factors one 
and three in software fair use cases if factor two were formally eliminated. 
Factor four also deserves strong consideration for an early retirement. 
This is because factors one (and several of its subfactors) and three also al-
ready address the concerns factor four is meant to protect. And again, arguably 
they do so more effectively than factor four itself. For instance, factor four’s 
focus on whether the use harms “the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work” largely boils down to whether the use substitutes for the original 
work in the marketplace.336 In assessing whether a particular use “supersedes 
the objects of the original” work, the transformative use subfactor already es-
sentially asks whether the use acts as a market substitute for the original 
work.337 Indeed, this overlap is precisely why so many courts hark back to the 
transformative use concept when analyzing factor four, as the Campbell Court 
did itself.338 
Factor one also already includes a “commercial use” inquiry, which asks 
whether the user is exploiting the copyrighted work without paying the “cus-
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tomary price.”339 This inquiry thus gives courts additional opportunities to as-
sess whether the use supplants a traditional market for the copyrighted work, 
thereby harming the market for it. In fact, as with the transformative use con-
cept, this subfactor’s connection to the concerns factor four is meant to address 
often leads courts to import this subfactor into their fourth factor analyses as 
well.340 Indeed, as we have seen, factor one’s subfactors, such as transforma-
tiveness and commerciality, often end up dictating the results under factor 
four.341 For these and related reasons, Beebe has characterized factor four as 
vacuous in terms of having its own standards.342 
Factor three’s focus on “the amount and substantiality” of the copyrighted 
work that the defendant took also already helps address factor four’s concerns. 
Uses of quantitatively or qualitatively insignificant portions of the copyrighted 
work, for instance, are less likely to result in market harm, as courts often rec-
ognize in their fair use analyses.343 On the other hand, using significant por-
tions of copyrighted works verbatim is more likely to result in market harm 
because such uses are more likely to function as a substitute for the original 
work.344 Thus, factor three also provides coverage for the issues factor four is 
meant to highlight. 
If mere duplication of efforts were the end of the story, that may not be 
enough to justify eliminating factor four. But like factor two, factor four’s du-
plicative efforts also carry the possibility of real detriment. One such harm of 
retaining duplicative inquiries across the factors is that what may be a relative-
ly straightforward analysis under factors one and three becomes more confused 
under factor four. This is so for reasons already discussed; factor four’s lack of 
clear standards tempts courts to resort to circular reasoning in analyzing 
whether the use harms the copyrighted work’s market.345 And courts at least 
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sometimes give in to that temptation.346 While factor one’s commerciality 
prong also presents opportunities for circular logic, the transformative use con-
cept helps temper that inclination. Furthermore, case law over the years has 
already done much to reign in the first factor’s commerciality prong so that the 
possibility of courts grossly misapplying it going forward seems less likely.347 
In sum, another implication from this study’s findings is that streamlining 
the fair use inquiry may be warranted. While factors two and four may point to 
legitimate concerns under the overall fair use rubric, other factors already ad-
dress those concerns and arguably do so more effectively. Relying on them 
exclusively thus seems warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has empirically examined the role transformative use plays in 
the overall fair use inquiry. The results confirm some commentators’ worst 
fears: transformative use is eating the fair use world. First, modern courts ap-
ply the transformative use doctrine more than ever before. And second, this 
study’s data show that the vast majority of modern courts use the transforma-
tive use concept throughout the fair use inquiry as the dominant means of re-
solving various fair use questions. 
But this development should be celebrated, not mourned. That celebra-
tion, however, comes with a few caveats. First, transformative use and the fair 
use doctrine must remain flexible constructs. Some contexts, such as software 
and modern art, may be ill-suited for typical understandings of transformative 
use and fair use. In such settings, courts must show adaptability in applying 
these doctrines. Second, though we believe the transformative use concept’s 
hegemony is overall a positive development in fair use jurisprudence, fair use 
still has room for improvement. In particular, removing factors two and four 
from the fair use inquiry would improve judicial economy without sacrificing 
those factors’ concerns. This is because other fair use factors, such as the trans-
formative use doctrine and factor three, can and often already do effectively 
address the concerns that factors two and four are meant to safeguard. 
                                                                                                                 
 346 See, e.g., Fox News Network, 883 F.3d at 179–80 (finding in favor of plaintiffs under the 
fourth factor because plaintiffs already developed a market with respect to defendant’s use of their 
copyrighted works); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386–88 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that although the defendants claim it is circular reasoning, “there is no 
circularity in saying, as we do say, that the potential for destruction of this market by widespread 
circumvention of the plaintiffs’ permission fee system is enough . . . to negate fair use”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 347 See Netanel, supra note 10, at 736–42 (discussing the ascendance of the transformative use 
subfactor under the first factor and overall fair use case law, particularly between 2006 to 2010). 




Table 13 shows that transformative use outcomes exhibit a statistically 
significant relationship to overall fair use outcomes, meaning that transforma-
tive use outcomes are a reliable predictor of fair use outcomes generally. Fur-
thermore, as reflected by its high coefficient and odds ratio values, transforma-
tive use’s relationship to fair use outcomes is stronger than that of any other 
factor one subfactor (the higher these values, the greater the variable’s predic-
tive capability is with respect to the dependent variable, which, in this case, is 
fair use outcomes). 
Table 13. Logistic Regression of the Fair Use Test’s Outcome as a Function of Factor  
One’s Subfactors in 441 Dispositive Opinions.348 
 Odds Ratio* Coefficient Standard Error Z Value p-value 
Intercept 1.406 0.341 0.194 1.756 0.079 
Commerciality 4.283 1.455 0.218 6.680 0.000 
Preamble 4.565 1.518 0.282 5.384 0.000 
Bad Faith 7.423 2.005 0.602 3.330 0.001 
Trans. Use 8.904 2.186 0.252 8.674 0.000 
*Boldface denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Tables 14 to 15 below show that transformative use outcomes exhibit a 
statistically significant relationship to factors one and four outcomes. Further-
more, transformative use’s relationship to factors one and four outcomes is 
stronger than that of any other factor one subfactor, as evidenced by its higher 
coefficient and odds ratio values. 
                                                                                                                 
 348 The closer the Pseudo R^2 value is to 1, the better the model is in explaining the observed 
variation. The Pseudo R^2 value here, 0.614, indicates an acceptable level of statistical reliability. 
Furthermore, the model accurately classified about ninety percent of the observations. 
 349 The pseudo R^2 value for this model, 0.765, indicates an acceptable level of statistical reliabil-
ity. Furthermore, the model accurately classified about ninety percent of the observations. 
Table 14. Logistic Regression of Factor One’s Outcome as a Function of Factor  
One’s Subfactors in 430 Dispositive Opinions.349 
 Odds Ratio* Constant Standard Error Z Value p-value 
Intercept 2.504 0.918 0.298 3.078 0.002 
Commerciality 12.988 2.564 0.370 6.938 0.000 
Preamble 16.219 2.786 0.444 6.269 0.000 
Bad Faith 1.300 0.262 0.684 0.384 0.701 
Trans. Use 19.595 2.975 0.380 7.831 0.000 
*Boldface denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 15. Logistic Regression of Factor Four’s Outcome as a Function of Factor  
One’s Subfactors in 426 Dispositive Opinions.350 
 Odds Ratio* Coefficient Standard Error Z Value p-value 
Intercept 1.812 0.594 0.171 3.473 0.001 
Commerciality 3.426 1.231 0.182 6.749 0.000 
Preamble 2.665 0.980 0.221 4.436 0.000 
Bad Faith 1.246 0.220 0.392 0.560 0.575 
Trans. Use 4.436 1.490 0.192 7.741 0.000 
*Boldface denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Table 16 below provides similar findings with respect to factor three out-
comes. We note that this model, based on tests of accuracy, appears to be the 
least reliable regression model of the three models testing transformative use’s 
relationship to the individual fair use factor outcomes. Nevertheless, its results 
appear to be statistically significant. 
Table 16. Logistic Regression of Factor Three’s Outcome as a Function of Factor  
One’s Subfactors in 366 Dispositive Opinions.351 
 Odds Ratio* Coefficient Standard Error Z Value p-value 
Intercept 0.502 -0.690 0.162 -4.263 0.000 
Commerciality 1.649 0.500 0.156 3.194 0.001 
Preamble 2.362 0.859 0.223 3.848 0.000 
Bad Faith 2.175 0.777 0.399 1.948 0.051 
Trans. Use 3.526 1.260 0.192 6.562 0.000 
*Boldface denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
Finally, Table 17 below presents the regression results testing whether 
medium shifts, uses in new contexts, and altering the original work with new 
expression reliably predict whether a court will find the use to be transforma-
tive. Our results show that each of these variables exhibits a statistically signif-
icant relationship with transformative use outcomes, including a negative rela-
tionship between medium shifts and a finding of transformative use (i.e., a 
shift in medium may actually predict a non-transformative use finding more 
often than not). It is important to note, however, that the relevant statistical 
                                                                                                                 
 350 Although the Pseudo R^2 value for this regression is less than ideal at 0.44, previous studies 
addressing similar questions have accepted lower levels of reliability in reporting their results. See 
Beebe, supra note 9, at 595 (showing a Pseudo R^2 value of 0.425); Sag, supra note 15, at 74 (show-
ing a Pseudo R^2 value of 0.073). Furthermore, this model accurately classified a little over eighty-six 
percent of the observations. 
 351 Because of the relatively low Pseudo R^2 value for this regression (0.334), we urge caution in 
trusting this model’s predictive capability. With that said, the model did exhibit an average classifica-
tion accuracy of 81.4%. 
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indicators of this particular regression model suggest some skepticism in trust-
ing the model’s predictive capabilities. 
Table 17. Logistic Regression of Transformative Use Outcomes as a Function of Medium 
Factors in 313 Dispositive Opinions.352 
 Odds Ratio* Coefficient Standard Error Z Value p-value 
Intercept 0.543 -0.610 0.292 -2.091 0.037 
Medium Shift 0.513 -0.668 0.252 -2.644 0.008 
New Context 3.782 1.330 0.282 4.712 0.000 
New Expression 1.508 0.411 0.141 2.910 0.004 
*Boldface denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 352 Though the model accurately predicted about sixty-eight percent of the results, the model’s 
Pseudo R^2 value was 0.116, which means that the model fit to the data is quite poor. Hence, though 
the results appear statistically significant, we urge caution in trusting this model’s predictive capabil-
ity. 
